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The progress of science in furnishing the government with means of espionage is not likely
to stop with wire tapping. Ways may some day be developed by which the government,
without removing papersfrom secret drawers, can reproduce them in court, and by which it
will be enabled to expose to ajury the most intimate occurrences of the home. Advances in
the psychic and related sciences may bring means of exploring unexpressed beliefs, thoughts
and emotions.'
I
INTRODUCTION

In the absence of legislative action, the fourth amendment to the
Constitution provides the most important barrier to "the progress of
science." Fourth amendment analysis inevitably involves a balancing of
competing interests-the collective needs of the society must be tempered by
the interests of individual human dignity and privacy. As these interests
change and science progresses, new balances must be struck. The issue of
drug testing in public employment presents a controversial example of such a
new balance to be struck.
Significant societal interests are advanced in support of drug testing of
2
public employees. Drug testing may increase employee safety and efficiency,
enhance the perceived integrity of the particular public entity, 3 as well as help
reduce society's overall demand for illegal drugs. 4 The individual interests
implicated by drug testing are also formidable. Being told by the government
to urinate into a jar brushes up against normal expectations of individual
privacy. Moreover, the tests are sometimes inaccurate, falsely implicating
innocent employees, 5 and they reveal a broad array of private facts, such as
pregnancy, medication

for a psychological

condition, and other similar

6
information that is not of legitimate concern to employers.

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928) (Brandeis,J., dissenting).
See infra notes 148-63 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 164-67 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 168-69 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 70-104 and accompanying text.

6.

See infra notes 134-37 and accompanying text.
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This article focuses on the fourth amendment issues presented by the drug
testing of public employees. 7 This issue, in a nutshell, is whether an
individual may be subjected to a highly intrusive bodily search in the absence
of any individualized suspicion to ensure that she does not use drugs, whether
at home or on thejob. If upheld, drug testing will represent the first instance
in the history of the fourth amendment in which a highly intrusive bodily
search has been permitted without any measure of individualized suspicion.8
Such an erosion of the fourth amendment should not be allowed without a
critical inquiry into the interests at stake, and the extent to which they are
served by drug testing. The authors believe that this inquiry leads to the
conclusion that testing public employees should be impermissible in the
absence of individualized suspicion.
Even if the reader disagrees with the authors' conclusion, however,
perhaps the more important point is that a critical examination of the
competing interests involved should be used to draw the fourth amendment
line between permissible and impermissible bodily searches in the absence of
individualized suspicion. If this critical analysis is not adhered to, there may
be no further fourth amendment lines left to draw, and the "progress of
science" is surely not complete. 9
Part II of the article presents a brief statistical overview of the nature and
scope of illegal drug use in America. It discusses how many illegal drug users
there are, who they are, and what costs they are estimated to impose upon
7. Unless otherwise stated, this article focuses solely upon drug testing of current public
employees. Occasionally, however, reference will be made to the distinct issues raised by the drug
testing of job applicants.
This article does not address employee drug testing in the private sector. Although the
Constitution does not regulate the conduct of private entities unless they act in concert with or at the
behest of a governmental entity, many of the arguments raised in this article against public sector
testing apply with equal force to the private sector. Those arguments plainly suggest a pressing need
for legislation to protect private sector employees from the degrading intrusion of urine testing. See
Note, Drug Testing in the Workplace: A Legislative Proposal to Protect Privacy, 13 J. LEGIS. 269 (1986)

[hereinafter Legislative Proposal]. Several states and municipalities have already enacted or proposed
legislation limiting the circumstances in which private employers may require employees to undergo
drug testing. See McGuiness, Memorandum of the Equal Employment Advisory Council (Aug. 20,
1986); Palefsky, Corporate Vice Precedents: The California Constitution and San Francisco's Worker Privacy
Ordinance, 11 NOVA L. REV. 669 (1987).

8. Although both searches without individualized suspicion and highly intrusive bodily
searches have been allowed, they have never been permitted in conjunction. Cases upholding
searches without individualized suspicion include United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543
(1976) (brief vehicle stops at fixed checkpoints to question occupants), and New York v. Burger, 107
S. Ct. 2636 (1987) (administrative search of business premises in closely regulated industry). Cases
permitting highly intrusive bodily searches have generally required probable cause. See, e.g.,
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (compelled blood test permissible without warrant, but
not without probable cause).
9. The issue, of course, is not whether drugs are harmful; they undoubtedly are. But the
severity of the current drug problem must not be allowed to cloud the proper fourth amendment
question: whether drug testing is a constitutionally permissible means of addressing the problem.
As Justice Black warned nearly twenty years ago, "the narcotics traffic can too easily cause threats to
our basic liberties by making attractive the adoption of constitutionally forbidden short cuts .... "
Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 427 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting). "Our Constitution was not
written in the sands to be washed away by a wave of new judges blown in by each successive political
wind." Id. at 426.
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American society. Part II also examines the prevalence of drug testing in the
workplace, describes the forms of drug testing, and details the accuracy of
drug testing. Part III of the article presents the major constitutional issue:
whether drug testing of a public employee without any individualized
suspicion of drug use is an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the
fourth amendment. This part of the article also discusses the first two drug
testing cases to be heard by the United States Supreme Court, National
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,10 and Railway Labor Executives Association v.
Burnley. i The final part of the article discusses procedural due process issues
raised by drug testing in the public sector.
II
THE LINES OF BATTLE:

DRUG USE AND DRUG TESTING IN THE

PUBLIC WORKPLACE

A.

The Nature and Scope of the American Drug Problem

1. How Many Drug Users Are There? Unfortunately, there is a dearth of
reliable scientific evidence detailing the extent of illegal drug use in America,
although it is undoubtedly a serious problem. Illicit drug use per capita in
2
this country is estimated to exceed that of any other industrialized nation.'
The permissiveness and experimentation of the 1960's included the use and
acceptance of numerous illegal drugs. American illicit drug use increased
throughout the 1960's and the 1970's, peaking by some estimates in 1979.13
Between 1979 and 1986 there was a statistically significant decline in illegal
drug use. 14 Accurate measurement of illicit drug use is difficult, however,
because the relative popularity of illegal drugs fluctuates when inexpensive
substitutes or new, more potent varieties of existing drugs reach the market. 15
In 1982, narcotics officials estimated that 3 to 5 percent of the American work
force used drugs regularly.16
10. 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1072 (1988).
11. 839 F.2d 575 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 2033 (1988).
12. Drug Abuse on the Job of Growing Concern, J. COMMERCE, Aug. 10, 1983, at 7A, col. 5. While
director of the federal anti-drug South Florida Task Force, Vice President George Bush predicted
that Americans would spend $100 billion on illegal drugs in 1983, about 5% of the gross national
product. Id.

13.

RESEARCH TRIANGLE INSTITUTE, ECONOMIC COSTS TO SOCIETY OF ALCOHOL AND DRUG ABUSE

AND MENTAL ILLNESS: 1980, at 6 (1984) [hereinafter R.T.I. STUDY].
14. Id.; see also Thomas, America's Crusade, TIME, Sept. 15, 1986, at 62.
15. SeeJekel &Allen, Trends in Drug Abuse in the Mid-1980s, 60 YALEJ. BIOLOGY & MED. 45, 45-46
(1987). Designer drugs are new, more powerful drugs created through the chemical modification of
other drugs. Id. For instance, the opiate meperidine (Demerol) is often modified to create highly
potent substances known as "designer heroins." Id. at 46. Designer drugs have a special advantage
for users because they are not technically illegal until they are identified, evaluated, and added
through administrative action to Schedule I or II under the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C.
§ 812 (1972). Jekel & Allen, supra, at 45-46.
16. Rohan, Pushers on the Payroll:A Nightmarefor Management, INDUSTRY WEEK, Feb. 8, 1982, at 52.

For statistical purposes, "regular use" is generally defined as use
preceding a survey. Chicago Tribune, Nov. 7, 1987, § 1, at 2,
Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA), at least 62 million Americans
marijuana at least once. Chicago Tribune, supra. In 1985, over

of an illegal drug during the month
col. 2. According to the National
twelve years or older have smoked
18 million Americans were regular
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To some extent, persons of all races, ethnicities, and socioeconomic
backgrounds use illegal drugs.' 7 Ironically, however, studies identify the two
extremes of poverty and affluence as characteristics often correlating with
drug abuse.' 8 In a study examining whether particular ethnic and racial
groups are more prone to alcohol or drug abuse, it was found that the
percentage breakdown of ethnic and racial groups in drug or alcohol
treatment programs merely reflected their percentage in the general
population.1 9 In fact, prior use of alcohol or drugs was found to be a stronger
20
predictor of abuse than race or ethnicity.
2. At What Cost? Employees who use illegal drugs regularly may use drugs
on the job or report to work under the influence of drugs. There is little
evidence regarding the number of employees who may be impaired on the
job, but those who use drugs on the job undoubtedly inflict upon employers
increased costs from inefficiency, greater absenteeism, accidents, and
insurance claims. The workplace costs of employee drug use are, however,
difficult to estimate, in part because it is not always clear whether drug use by
employees is a cause of inefficiency or merely a symptom of an already
users of marijuana, according to NIDA estimates. Id. One writer reported recently that the number
of Americans who have tried cocaine now exceeds 22 million, of whom 4.3 million are current users.
Thomas, supra note 14, at 62-63. A more recent study, however, indicates that cocaine use decreased
by 20% in the United States in 1987. The "significant decline" was attributed to changing attitudes
among students and young adults rather than law enforcement efforts. Chicago Tribune, Jan. 14,
1988, § 1, at 1, cols. 2 & 4 (citing UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH, U.S.
DEP'T

OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES,

DRUG USE AMONG AMERICAN HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS,

COLLEGE STUDENTS, AND OTHER YOUNG ADULTS (Jan. 1988)). To help put these statistics in
perspective, it is important to keep in mind that the estimated number of drug users is based on the
total population of the United States, which the Census Bureau estimated to be 243.4 million as of
July, 1987. Chicago Tribune, Dec. 30, 1987, § 1, at 4, col. 1.
Another journalist reported without citation that government calculations show regular drug use
among 25% of the population. Castro, Battling the Enemy Within, TIME, Mar. 17, 1986, at 53. The
claim that one in four Americans uses illegal drugs once per month, however, suggests an epidemic
of such titanic proportions as to strain the source's credibility severely. Such unsupported
speculation contributes little to responsible debate on America's drug problem.
17. Castro, supra note 16, at 54. See The Executive Addict, FORTUNE, June 24, 1985, at 24.
18. Jekel & Allen, supra note 15, at 50. Jekel and Allen conclude that "[t]he life style of poverty
tends to provide a negative emotional state which often leads to drug use. At the other financial
extreme, affluence makes drug addiction easier because of the availability of funds." Id. A Research
Triangle Institute study suggests a closer tie between poverty and illegal drug use. In that study,
"[ilt was found that persons who had ever used marijuana daily for a month or longer had household
incomes 27.9 percent lower than persons with otherwise similar characteristics." R.T.I. STUDY, supra
note 13, at 9. Because of lack of data and the generally lower incidence of non-marijuana drug use,
however, "statistical analysis of the impact of consumption of drugs other than marijuana yielded no
significant results relating abuse of the drugs to household income." Id. at A-20.
19. Hubbard, Schlenger, Rachal, Bray, Craddock, Cavanaugh & Ginzburg, Patterns of Alcohol and
Drug Abuse in Drug Treatment Clientsfrom Different Ethnic Backgrounds, 1987 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 60,

73.
20. Id. at 73-74. The authors conclude as follows:
In general, this analysis revealed that the ethnic differences in the patterns of alcohol
consumption and alcohol-related problems for drug treatment clients are similar to those for the
general population. However, what may be more revealing is the strong relationship between
drug-use patterns with alcohol consumption and alcohol-related problems. This relationship
seems much stronger than the relationship with ethnicity.
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inefficient employee. 2 t The only study of the issue seems to have overlooked
this difficulty, assuming all costs imposed by drug-using employees to have
been caused by the drugs, not the employee. This study, by the Research
Triangle Institute, estimated that employee drug use cost American industry
$25.7 billion in 1980,22 and that alcohol and drug use together cost American
society as a whole an estimated $136.4 billion. 2 3 One drug consulting firm
has reported that the average drug user is likely to be tardy three times as
often as nonusers, request time off during work 2.2 times more often, and
have 2.5 times as many absences of eight days or more. 24 Other experts,
25
however, dispute these statistics.
Drug use on the job is also believed to increase workplace accidents. One
writer suggests that drug users are three times as likely as nonusers to injure
themselves or someone else on the job. 26 Since 1975, investigators have
attributed about fifty train accidents to workers impaired by drugs or
alcohol. 2 7 Medical and property insurance claims are estimated to be
somewhat higher because of employee drug use. 28 There may also be a
connection between employee drug use and increased workplace theft and
embezzlement. 29 Authorities have uncovered several large-scale drug selling
30
operations in employment settings.
21. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services reported to Congress in 1984 that the
"difficult research task of identifying the extent to which drug and alcohol abuse affect specific
indices ofjob performance for individual workers (abusers compared with nonabusers) has not been
done." U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, PUB. No. 851372, DRUG ABUSE AND DRUG ABUSE
RESEARCH 26 (1984). "The fact is, very little is known about the complex relationship which
undoubtedly exists between drug abuse, worker performance and productivity or lack thereof, and
how the work setting influences or is influenced by drug abuse." Id.
22. R.T.I. STUDY, supra note 13, at 3.
23. Id. Drug abuse cost $46.9 billion and alcohol abuse cost $89.5 billion. Id. President Reagan
recently asserted that illegal drug use reduces American productivity by nearly $100 billion each
year, easily the highest such assessment to date. See Chicago Tribune, Feb. 9, 1988, § 1, at 5, col. 4.
Precisely how the President arrived at his unprecedented estimate was not revealed. See id.
24. Brecher, Taking Drugs on the Job, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 22, 1983, at 57.
25. In an affidavit submitted in National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 649 F. Supp.
380 (E.D. La. 1986), vacated, 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1072 (1988), Dr.
John P. Morgan described the Research Triangle Institute's study as "a kind of litany for the
promoters of urine testing." Morgan characterized the study's method of calculating the costs of
drug use as "preposterous," "manipulated," and "absurd." In Morgan's view, the study's results
relied unduly upon a survey of annual household income for households in which one member had
at one Lime used marijuana daily for one month. See R.T.I. STUDY, supra note 13, at 9.
26. Castro, supra note 16, at 53.
27. Id. Subsequent analysis, however, reveals that many transportation accidents attributed to
employee drug use actually resulted from alcohol use or other causes. McBay, Efficient Drug Testing.
Addressing the Basic Issues, 11 NOVA L. REV. 647 (1987). Recently, the Federal Railroad Administration
(FRA) has fallen under increasing criticism for its poor accident investigations. See, e.g., id.; A.
HOFFMAN, STEAL THIS URINE TEST: FIGHTING DRUG HYSTERIA IN AMERICA 122-24 (1987). On May
26, 1987, Dr. Dalbert J. Lacefield, supervisor of the Federal Aviation Administration's Forensic
Toxicology Unit, pleaded guilty to preparing false drug screening reports in connection with his
laboratory's participation in 1986 FRA accident investigations. A. HOFFMAN, supra, at 123.
28. See Cohen, Drugs in the Workplace, 45 J. CLIN. PSYCHIATRY 4, 6 (1984) (work-related drug use
increases the risks of injury, illness, and theft).
29. Castro, supra note 16, at 59; see Rohan, supra note 16, at 52.
30. Castro, supra note 16, at 58.
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Although illegal drug use is a serious problem, its significance must be
kept in proper perspective. By any standard of measurement, the more
pervasive national drug problem is the abuse of alcohol, tobacco, and legal
prescription and over-the-counter drugs. Each year 15,000 Americans die
from misuse of legal prescription drugs. 3 ' The National Institute on Drug
Abuse (NIDA) estimates that legal prescription drugs cause sixty percent of
emergency room admissions for drug overdoses and seventy percent ,f all
drug-related deaths. 32 Compared to the staggering number of deaths caused
each year by alcohol and tobacco abuse, the yearly number of deaths
attributable to illegal drug use appears small indeed. 3 3 The Research
Triangle Institute estimates that the costs imposed upon American industry
by employee alcohol use are nearly two times that caused by illegal drug
use.3 4 Employees with an alcohol problem are an estimated 21 percent less
productive than other employees. 3 5 Yet despite the tremendous costs of
alcohol use to American industry, very few drug testing programs currently
36
screen employees for alcohol abuse.
B.

The Employers' Response: The Use and Variety of Drug Testing.

1. The Increased Implementation of Drug Testing Prograns. Many employers
have responded to workplace costs of employee drug use by implementing
drug testing programs. Currently, about 40 percent of the Fortune 500
companies have instituted such programs or plan to do so, 3 7 and some
professional sports leagues have proposed player drug testing programs. 3 8
31. Zeese, Drug Hysteria Causing Use of Useless Urine Tests, 11 NOVA L. REV. 815, 816 (1987).
32. Id.
33. See Thomas, supra note 14, at 64. In 1980, alcohol killed 98,186 Americans, while tobacco
killed about 300,000. Id. Cocaine use resulted in 563 deaths nationwide in 1985. Id. There has never
been a death caused by marijuana or long-term chronic marijuana use. Zeese, supra note 32, at 816.
34. R.T.I. STUDY, supra note 13, at 3. In 1980, employee alcohol abuse reduced American
productivity by an estimated $50.6 billion, while illegal drug use reduced productivity an estimated
$25.7 billion.
35. Id. at 8, 62. According to NIDA director Charles Schuster, "[t]here is no question that
alcoholism in terms of social costs remains our number one problem. We can't lose sight of that
because of our emphasis on drugs." Thomas, supra note 14, at 64.
36. Employers perhaps ignore employee alcohol abuse because it traditionally carries less social
stigma than illegal drug use. One commentator alleges that "[t]he exclusion of alcohol from the
scope of any drug testing program strips it of rationality." Wisotsky, The Ideology of Drug Testing, 11
NOVA L. REV. 763, 768 (1987). See Denenberg & Denenberg, Drug Testing From the Arbitrator's
Perspective, 11 NOVA L. REV. 371, 373-77 (1987).
37. NOEL DUNIVANT & ASSOCIATES, DRUG TESTING IN MAJOR U.S. CORPORATIONS: A SURVEY OF
THE FORTUNE 500, at 3-6 (1985) (available from Noel Dunivant & Associates, Raleigh, N.C.)
[hereinafter DUNIVANT SURVEY].

In

1985, 18%

of surveyed companies tested for drugs, and an

additional 20% planned to do so within two years. Id. In 1986, private companies which required
urinalysis for all job applicants included IBM, DuPont, AT&T, General Motors, Ford Motor
Company, Exxon, Mobil, the New York Times, Capital Cities/ABC, Federal Express, Northeast
Utilities, Shearson Lehman, TWA, Greyhound Lines, Alcoa, Lockheed, and United Airlines.
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OFJUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, RESEARCH IN BRIEF, EMPLOYEE DRUG TESTING

POLICIES IN POLICE DEPARTMENTS 2 (Oct. 1986) [hereinafter N.I.J. SURVEY]; Legislative Proposal, supra

note 7, at 271.
38. See, e.g., Wong & Ensor, Major League Baseball and Drugs: Fight the Problem or the Player?, I1
NOVA L. REV. 779 (1987).
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Federal, state, and local public employers have increasingly developed
employee drug testing programs. Such programs for all federal agencies are
currently being developed in response to an Executive Order issued by
President Reagan. This order seeks to make the federal workforce a model
for eliminating drug use in the national workplace by requiring
implementation of such programs.3 9 In addition, drug testing programs are
already in place in all four branches of the military, 40 the Coast Guard, 4 ' and
42
several administrative agencies.
In addition to requiring testing of certain public employees, government
regulations require some private companies in highly regulated industries to
test their employees for illegal drug use. For example, most railroads now
test employees under regulations issued by the Federal Railroad
Administration, 43 and 90 percent of all nuclear power plants have instituted
testing programs on a voluntary basis under guidelines issued by the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission. 44 In addition, many public utilities such as electric
power companies and gas companies have voluntarily established drug testing
programs, 4 5 and a 1986 study revealed that nearly three-fourths of major
46
police departments surveyed require urine testing for all job applicants.
2. The Variety of Drug Testing Programs. When employers test and what they
do with the results varies significantly among employers. Testing may be
conducted randomly4 7 or upon a possible drug-related incident, such as an
accident. 48 Testing may be required for all job applicants, 4 9 for all
39. Exec. Order No. 12,564, 3 C.F.R. 224 (1987), repnnted in 5 U.S.C. § 7301 app. (West Supp.
1987); see Willette, Drug Testing Programs, in NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE, U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, RESEARCH MONOGRAPH No. 73, URINE TESTING FOR DRUGS OF ABUSE 12

(1986).
40. Willette, supra note 39, at 5-6.
41. Id.at 7.
42. The Federal Aviation Administration, Federal Railroad Administration, Drug Enforcement
Administration, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Customs Service, Secret Service Uniformed
Division, Central Intelligence Agency, and U.S. Postal Service have all implemented some type of
employee testing program. Id. at 7-10.
43. Id. at 7, 8. For a discussion of the regulations issued by the Federal Railroad Administration
and their application to employees of privately owned railroads, see Railway Labor Executives Ass'n
v. Burnley, 839 F.2d 575, 577-79 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 2033 (1988).
44. Willette, supra note 39, at 10.
45. Id.
46. N.IJ. SURVEY, supra note 37, at 2.
47. The four branches of the military and the Coast Guard utilize random testing programs.
Willette, supra note 39, at 5-7.
48. The Federal Railroad Administration drug testing regulations mandate drug and alcohol
testing of train crew members after major train accidents, impact accidents, and fatal accidents. 49
C.F.R. § 219.201 (1987). See Railway Labor Executives Ass'n v. Burnley, 839 F.2d 575, 577 (9th
Cir.), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 2033 (1988); see aLso Division 241 Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy,
538 F.2d 1264, 1267 (7th Cir.) (mandatory drug testing of bus drivers directly involved in serious
accidents), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976).
49. Of 33 major police departments surveyed in 1986, 73% screened all applicants for illegal
drug use. N.I.J. SURVEY, supra note 37, at 2.
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promotions,5 0 or as part of periodically required physicals. 5 1 Some programs
focus upon only specific types of employees. 5 2 Of the Fortune 500 companies
with testing programs, 80 percent test job applicants, 47 percent test
53
employees after accidents, and 13 percent test employees at random.
Drug testing programs also vary in terms of the actions taken toward
employees testing positive for illegal drug use. Many simply dismiss all
employees who test positive. 54 A few testing programs, however, require
employees who test positive to enter drug treatment or counseling programs
paid for by the company or employee health insurance. 55 About 30 percent of
Fortune 500 companies with testing programs have established in-house
employee assistance programs which refer drug abusing employees to
56
hospitals or clinics for treatment.
3. The Variety of Urine Tests. Drug testing programs may employ a variety of
different types of tests to evaluate the physiological components of urine.
Two of the most commonly used tests are the enzyme multiplied
immunoassay test (EMIT), and the gas chromatography-mass spectrometer
test (GC/MS). 5 7 The tests differ significantly in chemical evaluation process,
accuracy, and cost.

50. The U.S. Customs Service requires drug testing for all employees seeking transfer to
sensitive positions. See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 172 (5th Cir.
1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1072 (1988).
51. The Federal Aviation Administration and the Secret Service Uniformed Division test
employees for illegal drug use as part of required periodic physical examinations. Willette, supra
note 39, at 7, 9.
52. The U.S. Customs Service tests only personnel in "critical" positions, such as agents and
chemists. Id. at 9. The Drug Enforcement Administration and the Federal Bureau of Investigation
test only trainees, but they plan to extend testing incrementally to special agents and other critical
positions. Id. at 8-9. Similarly, President Reagan recently ordered drug testing for all federal
employees in "sensitive positions." Exec. Order No. 12,564, 3 C.F.R. 224, 226 (1987), reprinted in 5
U.S.C. § 7301 app. at 32 (West Supp. 1987). The actual scope of Reagan's somewhat vague
language is not clear. The Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons "decided that all positions,
clerical or otherwise, are 'sensitive' under the Executive Order." American Fed'n of Gov't
Employees v. Meese, 688 F. Supp. 547, 549 n.l (N.D. Cal. 1988).
53.

DUNIVANT SURVEY, supra note 37, at 3-5.

54. In the military, for example, a positive test result for illegal drug use may provide sufficient
ground for a dishonorable discharge. Willette, supra note 39, at 6.
55. In 1986, about one-fourth of major police departments surveyed indicated that treatment
would be appropriate for drug-using officers instead of termination, depending upon the
circumstances. N.I.J. SURVEY, supra note 37 at 2.
56. Castro, supra note 16, at 57. The Mobil Oil Company claims that its typical employee
assistance and drug treatment referral program is 70% to 75% successfil in rehabilitating
employees. Id.
57. These two tests are discussed for purposes of simplicity. There are several varieties of
immunoassay tests, such as the radioimmunoassay test (RIA) used by the military in its testing
programs. For purposes of this discussion, RIA and EMIT are not differentiated; the characteristics
of the tests are similar in essential respects. For a discussion of the RIA test and others, see
Dubowski, Drug-Use Testing: Scientific Perspectives, II NOVA L. REV. 415, 446-84 (1987).
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The EMIT is highly popular because it is inexpensive 58 and because it is
portable, easy to administer on the job location. 59 The EMIT relies upon a
process known as competitive displacement and bonding, in which
metabolites of illegal drugs present in the subject's urine displace preexisting
bonds in the testing reagent and create new molecular configurations which
indicate prior illegal drug use. 60 For reasons discussed below, 6 1 the EMIT
suffers from inherent inaccuracy problems that make reliance on its results ill62
advised without confirmation by GC/MS testing.
The much more expensive GC/MS test 6 3 requires laboratory conditions to
evaluate, 6 4 but is highly accurate. 6 5 In the GC/MS test, compounds present in
urine are classified in a gas chromatographer and fragmented by bombarding
them with high energy particles in a mass spectrometer. 6 6 Different
compounds split apart at different times, and the fragments' ionic weights
vary. 67 The time of fragmentation and the fragments' ionic weights are then
compared to data stored in a computer library of compounds. 68 If the
fragmentation time and ionic weights match the computer data for a
particular compound, a molecular "fingerprint" exists which is regarded as a
highly accurate confirmation of that compound's presence. 69 For optimum
efficiency and accuracy, the EMIT should be used for initial screening.
Positive EMIT results should then be subjected to GC/MS testing for more
reliable confirmation.
C.

A Critical Review of the Employers' Response: The Scientific
Limitations of Drug Testing Programs

Is drug testing a reasonable response by employers to the problem of
employee drug use? To answer this question, one must examine the scientific
limitations of drug testing programs.
58. EMIT screening costs $10 to $12, depending upon the number of drugs screened for. Drug
Testing FederalEmployees: Hearings before the House Subcomm. on Human Resources of the Comm. on Post Office
and Civil Service, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1986) (statement of William W. Manders, Ph.D., Former
Chief of Toxicology of the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology) [hereinafter Drug Testing Hearings].
59. Zeese, Marijuana Urinalysis Tests, 1 DRUG LAW REP. 25, 25 (1983) [hereinafter Marijuana
Urinalysis Tests]; Morgan, Problems of Mass Urine Screeningfor Misused Drugs, 16J. PSYCHOACTIVE DRUGS
305, 306 (1984).
60. Morgan, supra note 59, at 306-08.
61. See infra notes 70-82 and accompanying text.
62. Even the manufacturers of the EMIT recommend confirmation of a positive EMIT test by a
GC test alone, a GC/MS test, or another reliable test before any disciplinary action is taken. See, e.g.,
SYVA CORP., MEM. No. G-7, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT SYVA AND DRUG ABUSE TESTING
(available from SYVA Corp.).
63. The cost for one GC/MS test ranges from $50 to $100. See, e.g., Drug Testing Hearings, supra
note 58, at 12 (statement of Rep. Patricia Schroeder) ($80 estimate).

64. Kanter, Hollister & Musumeci, Identificationof Marijuana Use by Detection ofdelta-9-THC-I1-OIC
Acid by Using Thin-Layer Chromatography, 234 J. CHROMATOGRAPHY 201 (1982).
65. See Dubowski, supra note 57, at 469-84.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 479.
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1. The Inherent Inaccuracy of EMIT Testing. While the GC/MS test is quite
accurate, the EMIT is to some degree inherently inaccurate, even when
properly administered. The EMIT may yield a "false positive" by mistaking
legal substances for illegal drugs due to "cross-reactivity," 70 which occurs
when compounds present in urine react with the testing solution and displace
its preexisting chemical bonds in the same manner as by-products of the
targeted drug. 7' Courts examining testing programs have recognized the
serious accuracy problems of the EMIT, and many have suggested the need
72
for confirmation by a more accurate test.
The substances that the EMIT may mistake for various illegal drugs are
numerous. Legal prescription and over-the-counter drugs such as aspirin,
Contac, and Nyquil may cause a false positive result. 73 Also, certain foods

may trigger a false positive EMIT finding. For example, poppy seeds may be
mistaken for opiates such as heroin and morphine,7 4 and herbal teas may be
confused with cocaine. 75 Bodily enzymes with which the EMIT testing

reagent may react are excreted through the urine. 76 If an individual happens
to discharge above-average amounts of those enzymes, the EMIT may register
a false positive. 77 The same problem may occur with the polar acids present
in urine. The concentration and bonding properties of these acids vary with
the body chemistry of the subject, and they may cross-react with the EMIT
testing reagent. 78 Some scientific evidence also suggests that higher
concentrations of the pigment melanin present in the bodies of blacks and
Hispanics may cause false positives. 79 Because of cross-reactivity, it is

70.

Morgan, supra note 59, at 309.

71. Id. at 309-12.
72. See, e.g., National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 649 F. Supp. 380, 389-90 (E.D.
La. 1986), vacated, 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1072 (1988); Lovvorn v. City
of Chattanooga, 647 F. Supp. 875, 877 (E.D. Tenn. 1986), aft'd, 846 F.2d 1539 (6th Cir. 1988);
Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1521 (D.NJ. 1986); Storms v. Coughlin, 600 F. Supp.
1214, 1217 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
73. See Marijuana Urinalysis Tests, supra note 59, at 26; Morgan, supra note 59, at 309. Although
President Reagan volunteered to submit to drug testing as an example for others, he clearly
recognized the danger of an incorrect positive result arising from his use of legal prescription drugs.
According to a White House statement, the President's scheduled urinalysis was cancelled because
"medication administered in connection with the [President's urological] examination could cause an
inaccurate result." Legal Times, Sept. 1, 1986, at 11, col. I (commentary by Representative Donald
Edwards).
74. Drug Testing Hearings, supra note 58, at 54 (statement of William Manders, Ph.D.). In an
attempt to reduce the inaccuracy of drug testing caused by cross-reactivity, New York State
Corrections Commissioner Thomas Coughlin banned poppy seeds from the New York prison system
kitchens, commissaries, and vending machines. Chicago Tribune, Jan. 5, 1988, § I at 4, col. 1.
75. Legislative Proposal,supra note 7, at 269, 274 n.40.
76. Morgan, supra note 59, at 312.
77. Id. at 312. The significance of this aspect of the cross-reactivity problem is not yet clear, but
one study documented the appearance of the enzyme lysozyme at levels high enough to interfere
with analysis of 10% of urine samples processed by one laboratory. Id.
78. Bible, Screening Vorkers For Drugs: The Constitutional Implications of Urine Testing in Public
Employment, 24 AM. Bus. L.J. 309, 312 (1986).
79. See Dubowski, supra note 57, at 516.
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estimated that 5 percent 8 ° to 25 percent 8 ' of the positive results indicated by
EMIT testing are incorrect, even if the EMIT is properly administered and
readings, thus failing to
evaluated. The EMIT may also register false negative
82
drugs.
illegal
used
have
who
identify those subjects
2. The Administrative Inaccuracy of Drug Testing. While the EMIT is inaccurate
even when properly administered, an EMIT positive result confirmed by
GC/MS testing is quite reliable. 83 This level of scientific accuracy, however,
may be obtained only if testing administrators carefully observe strict
processing procedures. Administrative errors may result from incorrect
collection processes, sample mislabeling, improper training of administrators
and lab technicians, dirty or uncalibrated laboratory equipment, or failure to
keep urine specimens at the proper temperature. Since even the most
accurate test is administered by fallible humans, errors are bound to occur in
84
any large-scale testing program.
The Center for Disease Control (CDC) in Atlanta conducted a nine year
study of thirteen independent laboratories which revealed that some field
testing programs had a false-positive rate ranging from 6 to 60 percent
depending upon the drug being tested for.8 5

The error rate for false

negatives was even higher.8 6 The factors of operator error, inadequate
testing protocol, and poor laboratory quality control are, of course, to some
extent correctable. Nevertheless, the CDC study indicates that even
established companies with professional technicians and comprehensive
testing controls remain subject to remarkably high rates of error. The study
concluded that these randomly selected laboratories displayed "serious
80. Note, Drug Testing.- America's New Work Ethic?, 15 STETSON L. REv. 883, 911 (1986)
[hereinafter America's New Work Ethic?]. See also Allen & Stiles, Specificity of the EMIT Drug Abuse Urine
Assay Methods, 18(a) J. CLIN. TOXICOLOGY 1043, 1062 (1981) (3% to 5% false positive rate).
Legal Times, supra note 73, at 11, col. 2 (commentary by Representative Donald Edwards).
81.
82. See Allen & Stiles, supra note 80, at 1062.
83. See Dubowski, supra note 57, at 474.
84. The U.S. military experience is a compelling example of the danger of inaccuracy in mass
testing programs. The military drug screening program has been described as "an administrative
nightmare of inaccurately labeled, switched, or contaminated specimens." Drug Testing Hearings,supra
note 58, at 70 (statement of Representative Michael D. Barnes). The Department of Defense, to date
the largest entity to implement mass drug testing, was forced to "reconsider punitive actions taken
against 70,000 soldiers who had been disciplined on drug charges, because their drug tests had been
faulty." Id. at 1 (statement of Hon. Gary L. Ackerman, Chairman of the Committee). Of 6,000
positive samples later retested by the Navy, "2,000 could not 'be scientifically substantiated as
accurate' and another 2,000 lacked some form of documentation." Bible, supra note 78, at 313.
A military investigation of the testing program found "a devastating error rate." Morgan, supra
note 59, at 313. The investigation concluded "that most errors were not related to the tests
themselves but to poor management, inadequate personnel, broken chain of custody, and faulty
maintenance and transmission of reports and records." Id.
85. Hansen, Caudill & Boone, Crisis in Drug Testing, 253J. AM. MED. Ass'N 2382, 2382 (1985).
The CDC study reported the following false positive error rates: barbiturates, 0% to 60%;
amphetamines, 0% to 37%; methadone, 0% to 36%; cocaine, 0% to 6%; and morphine, 0% to
10%. Id.
86. See id. The CDC report revealed the following false negative error rates: barbiturates, 11%
to 94%; amphetamines, 19% to 100%; methadone, 0% to 33%; cocaine, 0% to 100%; and
morphine, 5% to 100%. Id.
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shortcomings" in quality control even though they knew they were being
87
monitored.
3. Limitations on the Probative Value of Drug Testing. Having discussed the
extent to which drug tests are able to detect illicit substances, it is useful, in
order to assess the probative value of urinalysis, to examine what the tests do
not show. First, even a correct positive test result for marijuana use does not
prove that the test subject ever used marijuana himself. Depending upon
what concentration of an illicit substance metabolite constitutes a positive test
result, a positive result could be caused by the subject's passive inhalation of
88
smoke from marijuana used by someone else.
Second, urine testing shows neither intoxication 89 nor actual job
impairment. 90 Rather, it indicates only that the subject ingested the detected
drug within the preceding days or weeks. 9' The tests cannot identify the
presence of an illicit drug directly; instead, they determine prior use of an
illicit drug inferentially by screening for the presence of its by-products in the
92
urine.
For instance, prior use of marijuana is determined by screening not for the
intoxicating chemical itself, tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), but for its by87.
88.

Id. at 2386.
See Dubowski, supra note 57, at 512; Cone &Johnson, Contact Highs and Urinary Cannabinoid
Excretion After Passive Exposure to Marijuana Smoke, 40 CLIN. PHARMACOL. THERAP. 247-56 (1986);
Zeidenberg, Bordon & Nahas, MarijuanaIntoxication by Passive Inhalation: Documentation by Detection of
Urinary Metabolites, 134 AM. J. PSYCHOLOGY 76 (1977).
89. Cohen, Drugs in the Workplace, 45:12J. CLIN. PSYCHIATRY 4, 5 (1984) ("A positive urine test

for marijuana does not necessarily mean one is intoxicated."). The Federal Railroad Administration
has recognized that urinalysis does not measure current impairment, and recommends in its drug
testing regulations that a blood test be administered along with urinalysis in order to better insure
that a positive test result indicates current impairment. See 49 C.F.R. § 219.309(b)(2) (1986); see also
Railway Labor Executives Ass'n v. Burnley, 839 F.2d 575, 597-98 (9th Cir.) (Alarcon, J., dissenting),
cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 2033 (1988).
90.

Lundberg, Mandatory Unindicated Urine Drug Screening: Still Chemical McCarthyism, 256 J.A.M.A.

3003, 3004 (1986) ("Under no circumstances can impairment be diagnosed or even presumed from a
urine test result."); Legislative Proposal, supra note 7, at 274 n.45 ("The effects of drug use have not
been correlated with specific concentrations of drug metabolites in urine specimens."). Bible, supra
note 78, at 319.
It could also be noted that the claim that marijuana use reduces productivity is somewhat suspect.
A recent assessment of three studies of marijuana use concluded that chronic users showed no
evidence of intellectual or neurological damage, no changes in personality, and no loss of will to
participate in society. Marijuana, THE HARVARD MEDICAL SCHOOL MENTAL HEALTH LETrER, Nov.
1987, at 1, 3. In addition, analyses of marijuana intoxication have revealed little or no loss of motor
coordination. See Wisotsky, supra note 36, at 775; Zeese, supra note 31, at 817. See also Morgan, supra
note 59:
[T]he descriptions of supposed malfunction all ignore an experimental and anecdotal listing of
drug use that improves work performance. Both ancient Peruvian miners and modern Jamaican
workers have been characterized as working better under drug influence. A variety of studies
have indicated that stimulant drug use may increase productivity in a variety of settings. Modern
cultural belief and conventional wisdom demand that such evidence be explained away or
ignored.
Morgan, supra note 39, at 306 (citations omitted).
91. See Dubowski, supra note 57, at 530. (For example, approximate duration of detectability of
cocaine is two to five days; of benzodiazepines, three to ten days.).
92.

See generally id. at 446-84.
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product metabolite, 93 which appears only after THC breaks down and its
intoxicating effects disappear. 94 Because the target metabolite does not
appear until intoxication passes, testing "can establish only marijuana use, not
intoxication."9 5 The metabolite is detectable in the body of a casual user for
several days and even longer in the chronic user. 9 6 The use of other drugs
can have a similar effect, permitting detection of by-products long after
97
intoxication has passed.
Because urine testing cannot detect present intoxication or the time that
the illegal drugs were taken, it cannot measure job impairment accurately.
These serious shortcomings necessarily permit an employer's drug testing to
scrutinize an employee's off-duty drug use, whether or not that use impairs
her job performance. 98
In addition, testing may fail to identify those drug-using employees who
avoid or manipulate tests. If employees learn of the testing date, drug users
may merely abstain from drug use in order to test negative. Drug users may
also neutralize evidence of drug use by adulterating their samples with
substances as common as table salt. 99 A drug-using employee may even
substitute a drug-free urine sample for her own.
The most telling limitation on the probative value of drug testing is its
statistical unreliability. The likelihood that a given positive result is correct
depends entirely upon the extent to which the tested group actually uses
drugs. If one assumes that 5 percent' 0 0 of a group of employees uses illegal
drugs and that an employer uses a drug testing program with 95 percent
93. Bible, supra note 78, at 311. Urinalysis for marijuana use targets the THC metabolite llnor-delta-9-THC-9-carboxylic acid. Id.
94. Id. at 311. The THC itself has a life of only two to three hours, the length of marijuana
intoxication. Id. at 311 n.7.
95. Id. at 319 (emphasis in original).
96. See Dubowski, supra note 57, at 530.
97.

Id.

98.

Cohen, supra note 95, at 5. Whether government employers may forbid off-duty drug use

without proof of job impairment is debated. See generally America's New Work Ethic, supra note 80, at

898-901 (discussing the scope of government's fight to regulate its employees' private lives). The
Civil Service Reform Act provides that government supervisors must not "discriminate for or against
any employee or applicant for employment on the basis of conduct which does not adversely affect
the performance of the employee or applicant or the performance of others." 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(10)
(1982). One commentator recently asked: "If the employer can fire a person for smoking marijuana
on a Saturday night, what prevents him from regulating such things as off-duty alcohol consumption
or even sleeping habits in an effort to ensure that the employee works to his full capacity?" Legislative
Proposal,supra note 7, at 279.

In the public sector, the courts seem willing to allow employers to forbid off-duty use altogether
when the job affects public safety and when the agency's integrity in the eyes of the public is
necessary for it to function effectively. See, e.g., City of Palm Bay v. Bauman, 475 So. 2d 1322, 1326
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (allowing prohibition of off-duty drug use of police and firefighters because
of potential dangers their jobs entail); Bostic v. McClendon, 650 F. Supp. 245, 250 (N.D. Ga. 1986)
("The open violation of narcotic laws by its officers does hinder the police department's ability to
effectively carry out its statutory responsibilities, and therefore the police department does have a
legitimate, if lesser, interest in preventing such off-duty conduct.").
99. See Morgan, supra note 59, at 309.
100. This figure lies in the upper range of the estimated prevalence of drug use among employees
according to Rohan, supra note 16, at 52.
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accuracy to screen the group,' 0 ' the employer's "accurate" program will yield
one false positive result for every correct positive result.' 0 2 If only 2 percent
of the group uses illegal drugs, three out of every four positive results will be
incorrect. 0 3 If all 2.8 million federal workers are tested as suggested by the
President's Commission on Organized Crime, an estimated 140,000 workers
10 4
will be accused and disciplined unjustly.
III
DRUG TESTING AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

But even if the front door of the house is no longer protected by the Constitution, surely it
had been thought until now that the bathroom door is. 105
A.

The Purpose and Scope of the Fourth Amendment

Against this factual background, careful application of fourth amendment
doctrine to random drug testing programs in the public sector reveals that
such programs are unconstitutional searches and seizures under most
circumstances. The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution
provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized. ' 6

"The fundamental command of the Fourth Amendment is that searches
and seizures be reasonable ..
,107
"..
The amendment prohibits only
unreasonable searches and seizures.' 0 8 What is reasonable, however, depends
on the context of the search.' 0 9 The prevailing test for "reasonableness" was
set forth by the Supreme Court in Bell v. Wolfish:"10 "The test of
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise
101. This is a generous estimate, given reported drug testing error rates. See supra notes 70-87
and accompanying text.
102. Lundberg, supra note 89, at 3004.
103. This analysis is illustrated by the following table:
Prevalence, %

Predictive Value of a
Positive Result, %

0.1
1.0
2.0
5.0

2
16
28
50

10.0
50.0

68
95

Id. at 3003. See also P. CHAPIN, DRUG TESTING: A PROBABILISTIC ASSESSMENT (1986).
104. Drug Testing Hearings, supra note 58, at 39.
105. District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13, 18 (D.C. Cir. 1949), aff'd, 339 U.S. 1 (1950).
106. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
107. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985).
108. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 147 (1925).
109. New Jersey v T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985).
110. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
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definition or mechanical application. In each case it requires a balancing of
the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that
the search entails." '' '
It is difficult to predict with certainty, however, the exact test the Supreme
Court will use when confronted with the testing of public employees. Most
recently, in O'Connor v. Ortega, 112 the Court indicated that searches of
government employees for noninvestigatory, work-related purposes, as well as for
investigations of work-related misconduct, should be judged by the standard of
reasonableness under all the circumstances. Under this reasonableness
standard, both
1
the inception and the scope of the intrusion must be reasonable. 13

The Court explicitly did not, however, "address the proper Fourth
Amendment analysis for drug and alcohol testing of employees."' '4 It is
difficult to discern what independent meaning is communicated by this most
recent formulation of the test." t 5 Depending upon the context, it may be
impossible to determine whether a search is justified at its inception without
first considering the scope of the search. For example, the "scope" of a drug
test is the compelled tender of a urine specimen. It may be compelled under
direct or indirect observation. All of these considerations seem appropriate
to take into account when determining whether the drug test was justified at
its inception.'

16

Whether the inception and scope of a search are reasonable would seem in
the final analysis to depend upon a balancing of the interests outlined in Bell
Even if the Court utilizes the recent O'Connor formulation, it appears
inevitable that the same balancing of governmental interests against
individual privacy rights articulated in Bell will in the end determine the
constitutionality of public employee drug testing programs. Thus, to
determine the constitutionality of such drug testing, the state interests
advanced by testing must be balanced against its intrusiveness upon
111.

Id. at 559.

112.

107 S. Ct. 1492 (1987).

113.

Id. at 1502-03.

114.

Id. at 1504 n.2. O'Connor also may be distinguished factually. In O'Connor, a plurality

concluded that a public employer could search an employee's office and desk without reasonable

suspicion of illegal conduct. Id. at 1502. The plurality observed, however, that such a search is a
relatively limited intrusion upon employee privacy because it involves a search of office space, not the
home. Id. Moreover, the plurality reasoned, an "employee may avoid exposing personal belongings
at work by simply leaving them at home." Id. at 1502. In contrast, drug testing involves a search of
the person, not an office. One cannot avoid such a search by leaving one's urine at home.
115. See id. at 1514 n. 14 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("I would fault the plurality for its failure to
give much substance to the standard it has borrowed almost verbatim from New Jersey v. T.L.O."); id.
at 1505 (Scalia,J., concurring) ("I would object to the formulation of a standard so devoid of content
that it produces rather than eliminates uncertainty in this field"); Feliciano v. City of Cleveland, 661
F. Supp. 578, 587 (N.D. Ohio 1987) ("O'Connor's standard of reasonableness for employer searches,
finally articulated as 'reasonableness under the circumstances,' is a curious concept indeed. The
Court offers little guidance about how this concept shall be given content."). The "inception" and
"scope" language is derived from Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968), and was used again by the
Court in New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985), but in both Terry and T.L.O. the Court
attempted to give content to the language by tying it more carefully to the context of the search
involved.
116. For an example of this difficulty, see infra note 250.
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employees' privacy interests; the greater the intrusion occasioned by the
search, the greater must be the governmental interest in conducting the
search. ' 17
B.

The Threshold Issue: A Drug Test Is a Search

The threshold issue in fourth amendment analysis is whether a drug test is
a search. If the test is not a search, then no fourth amendment objection
arises, which obviates the need to balance state and individual privacy
interests. Whether a drug test is a search generally depends upon whether
there exists a "reasonable expectation of privacy" in the act of urination.' 18
Evaluating reasonable expectations of privacy for purposes of determining
whether an intrusion constitutes a fourth amendment search is an abstract,
non-case-specific inquiry which focuses upon whether society is prepared to
recognize that the employee has a legitimate expectation of privacy from drug
tests. 1 9 In response to this question, the courts have uniformly found that a
drug test is a search within the meaning of the fourth amendment. 120 Despite
117. See Sec. & Law Enforcement Emp. Dist. C.82 v. Caney, 737 F.2d 187, 208 (2d Cir. 1984). See
also Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 766 (1985).
118. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
119.

Id. at 361.

120. See, e.g., Policeman's Benevolent Ass'n v. Township of Washington, 850 F.2d 133, 135-36
(3d Cir. 1988); Penny v. Kennedy, 846 F.2d 1563, 1565 (6th Cir. 1988); Lovvorn v. City of
Chattanooga, 846 F.2d 1539 (6th Cir. 1988); Rushton v. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 844 F.2d 562,
566 (8th Cir. 1988); Railway Labor Executives Ass'n v. Burnley, 839 F.2d 575, 579-80 (9th Cir.), cert
granted, 108 S. Ct. 2033 (1988);Jones v. McKenzie, 833 F.2d 335, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Everett v.
Napper, 833 F.2d 1507, 1511 (11 th Cir. 1987); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,
816 F.2d 170, 175 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1072 (1988); National Fed'n of Fed.
Employees v. Weinberger, 818 F.2d 935, 942 (D.C. Cir. 1987); McDonell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302,
1307 (8th Cir. 1987); Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136, 1142 (3d Cir.) (urinalysis implicitly
found a search when court discussed and applied necessarily subsequent fourth amendment
analysis), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 577 (1986); Division 241 Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy, 538
F.2d 1264, 1267 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976); Harmon v. Meese, 3 Individual Emp.
Rights Cas. (BNA) 865, 866-67 (D.D.C.July 29, 1988); American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Meese,
688 F. Supp. 547, 550-51 (N.D. Cal. 1988); National Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. Carlucci, 680 F.
Supp. 416, 430 (D.D.C. 1988); American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Dole, 670 F. Supp. 445, 447
(D.D.C. 1987); Taylor v. O'Grady, 669 F. Supp. 1422, 1434 (N.D. I1. 1987); Amalgamated Transit
Union, Local 1277 v. Sunline Transit Agency, 663 F. Supp. 1560, 1566 (C.D. Cal. 1987); Feliciano v.
City of Cleveland, 661 F. Supp. 578, 586 (N.D. Ohio 1987); Mullholland v. Department of Army, 660
F. Supp. 1565, 1569 (E.D. Va. 1987); American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Weinberger, 651 F.
Supp. 726, 732 (S.D. Ga. 1986); Bostic v. McClendon, 650 F. Supp. 245, 248-49 (N.D. Ga. 1986);
Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1513 (D.N.J. 1986); Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F.
Supp. 482, 488-89 (N.D. Ga. 1985); Patchogue-Medford Congress of Teachers v. Board of Educ.,
119 A.D.2d 35, 37-38, 505 N.Y.S.2d 888, 890 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986), aft'd, 70 N.Y.2d 57, 67-68, 510
N.E.2d 325, 329-30, 517 N.Y.S.2d 456, 460-61 (1987); Turner v. Fraternal Order of Police, 500 A.2d
1005, 1007-08 (D.C. 1985); Caruso v. Ward, 133 Misc. 2d 544, 546-47, 506 N.Y.S.2d 789, 792 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1986), aff'd, 131 A.D.2d 214, 520 N.Y.S.2d 551 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987); City of Palm Bay v.
Bauman, 475 So. 2d 1322, 1324-25 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985). Even mandatory urinalysis of
prisoners has been found to constitute a search. See, e.g., Spence v. Farrier, 807 F.2d 753, 755 (8th
Cir. 1986); Tucker v. Dickey, 613 F. Supp. 1124, 1127-28 (W.D. Wis. 1985); Storms v. Coughlin, 600
F. Supp. 1214, 1217-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
A few courts have found that a drug test is a seizure, rather than, or in addition to being a search.
See, e.g., National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 649 F. Supp. 380, 386-87 (E.D. La. 1986)
(search and seizure), vacated, 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1072 (1988);
McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122, 1127 (S.D. Iowa 1985), aff 'd as modified, 809 F.2d 1302 (8th
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the novelty of the technology, the courts have recognized that drug testing
implicates central fourth amendment values, and that individuals have
2
legitimate expectations of privacy in the act of urination.' '
C.

The Individual Interests: The Intrusiveness of Drug Testing

Once courts determine that a drug test is a search, they must balance the
intrusiveness of the search against the government's need for the information
Cir. 1987). In only one decision has a judge suggested that the reasonableness of a drug test
depends upon its characterization as a search or seizure. See Turner v. Fraternal Order of Police, 500
A.2d 1005, 1010-11 (D.C. 1985) (Nebeker, J., concurring). After finding that urinalysis constitutes a
seizure, id.at 1010, Judge Nebeker analogized the seizure of urine to seizures of personal physical
characteristics routinely exposed to the public, such as the voice or handwriting. Id. at 1011. Judge
Nebeker concluded that the seizure of urine through testing does not violate the fourth amendment
because an individual retains no possessory interest in her urine when she discards it, id, and
routinely exposes her urine to the public by flushing it into a public sewer.
judge Nebeker's analysis, however, is unacceptably simplistic. An individual typically regards
urination as a private bodily function, and reasonably expects her urine to become indistinguishible
from that of others when she flushes it down the drain. She certainly does not reasonably expect that
her urine, once discarded, may be seized by the government and scrutinized for the physiological
data it may reveal. Moreover, the seizure of an individual's urine for analysis is qualitatively much
more intrusive than seizures of immutable bodily characteristics such as voice patterns or
handwriting that are routinely exposed to the public. Cf American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v.
Weinberger, 651 F. Supp. 726, 733 (S.D. Ga. 1986) (seizures of immutable bodily characteristics
such as fingerprints, fingernail clippings, and hair clippings not as intrusive as a urine test).
121. Interestingly, several courts have noted in dicta that drug testing conducted pursuant to a
required medical examination minimizes the intrusiveness of the search, makes the search reasonable,
or does not implicate the fourth amendment at all. See, e.g., Jones v. McKenzie, 833 F.2d 335, 340
(D.C. Cir. 1987) ("[Tlhis case involves only testing that is conducted as part of a routine, reasonably
required, annual medical examination. This has the effect of ensuring that the intrusion on the
employee's privacy is minimized."); City of Palm Bay v. Bauman, 475 So.2d 1322, 1325 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1985) (urinalysis absent reasonable suspicion violates the fourth amendment "except for urine
testing performed as a part of physical examinations required by City Personnel Policy for initial
employment, or annually, or at other designated career times"); Caruso v. Ward, 133 Misc. 2d 544,
555, 506 N.Y.S.2d 789, 798 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986) ("No one questions the right to establish as a
condition of employment the requirement of a health checkup, ... [b]ut routine health examinations
are far different than testing for the specific purpose of finding evidence of drugs."), aff'd, 131
A.D.2d 214, 520 N.Y.S.2d 551 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987); McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122, 1130
n.6 (S.D. Iowa 1985) ("The Fourth Amendment, however, does not preclude taking a body fluid
specimen as part of a pre-employment examination or as part of any routine periodic physical
examination that may be required of employees.
), aff'd as modified, 809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir.
1987).
The courts have not offered any reasons why drug testing conducted pursuant to a required
medical examination escapes serious fourth amendment scrutiny. Two considerations perhaps
support the courts' apparently lenient attitude toward such testing. First, the medical examination
context is quite removed from the criminal or investigatory context in which fourth amendment
searches typically occur. Second, because doctors commonly ask patients to supply urine samples for
routine medical testing, an individual attending a physical examination possesses a somewhat
diminished expectation of privacy in his urine.
Nevertheless, to justify a virtual exemption from fourth amendment constraints, such testing must
remain true to its avowed purpose; results must be used only for medical treatment, rather than adverse
employment action or criminal prosecution. Employers should not be permitted to disguise
unconstitutional searches of their employees as medical examinations. Thus, in cases challenging
drug tests conducted during a required physical examination, courts should inquire whether the drug
testing in question was part of a bona fide medical examination. Relevant questions include: How
are the test results used? What substances are tested for? When was the program instituted? Did
particular employees demonstrate symptoms of drug use or dependency prior to the commencement
of testing? Were all employees tested?
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that the search will reveal. 122 In focusing on the intrusiveness of a search,
23
courts first examine the context of an individual's expectation of privacy.'
124
What is reasonable in one context may not be reasonable in another.
Although most public employees legitimately have very strong expectations of
privacy both in the act of urination and in its contents, an employee's
expectations of privacy may be diminished if she enters an occupation which
12 5
requires significant preparedness and discipline, such as the military,
intensely regulated industries, 126 nuclear power plants, 127 prisons, 128 public
transportation,' 29 or law enforcement. 3 0 On the other hand, public

employees whose occupations do not directly implicate public safety or other
similar governmental interests retain the same level of privacy enjoyed by the
ordinary citizen. 13'

After courts assess the context of the employee's expectations of privacy,
they examine the intrusiveness of the search. Because an individual generally
has the highest expectations of privacy in her body, searches violating the
integrity of the body are greater invasions of privacy than inspections of
personal effects. 13 2 The Supreme Court has observed that "even a limited
33
search of the person is a substantial invasion of privacy."'
There are three compelling reasons why drug tests are very intrusive, even
when compared with other bodily searches. First, the tests reveal not only
past drug use, but also numerous other physiological facts that are of no
legitimate interest to the employer. While exposing past illegal drug use,
122. O'Connor v. Ortega, 107 S. Ct. 1492, 1497 (1987) (plurality opinion). Traditional fourth
amendment analysis would also inquire whether a warrant is required before the search may be
conducted. In O'Connor, the Court indicated that "the realities of the workplace.., strongly suggest
that a warrant requirement would be unworkable." Id. at 1500. Accordingly, the Court proceeded
directly to a balancing analysis. Id.
123. Id. at 1497. Accord United States v. Thomas, 729 F.2d 120, 123-24 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 846 (1984); Turner v. Fraternal Order of Police, 500 A.2d 1005, 1007 (D.C. 1985).
124. Committee for GI Rights v. Callaway, 518 F.2d 466, 476 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
125. See, e.g., id. at 477.
126. See, e.g., Policeman's Benevolent Ass'n v. Township of Washington, 850 F.2d 133, 135, 141
(3d Cir. 1988); Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136, 1142 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 577
(1986).
127. See, e.g., Rushton v. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 844 F.2d, 562, 566 (8th Cir. 1988).
128. See, e.g., McDonell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302, 1308 (8th Cir. 1987).
129. See, e.g., Division 241 Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264, 1267 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976).
130. See, e.g., Policeman's Benevolent Ass'n v. Township of Washington, 850 F.2d 133, 141 (3d
Cir. 1988); Caruso v. Ward, 133 Misc. 2d 544, 548, 506 N.Y.S.2d 789, 793 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986), aff'd,
131 A.D.2d 214, 520 N.Y.S.2d 551 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987); Turner v. Fraternal Order of Police, 500
A.2d 1005, 1008 (D.C. 1985); City of Palm Bay v. Bauman, 475 So. 2d 1322, 1324 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1985).
131. See, e.g., Harmon v. Meese, 3 Individual Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) 865, 867-68 (D.D.C. July
29, 1988); American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Meese, 688 F. Supp. 547, 550-51 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
But see Patchogue-Medford Congress of Teachers v. Board of Educ., 119 A.D.2d 35, 40, 505 N.Y.S.2d
888, 891 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986), aff'd, 70 N.Y.2d 57, 68-69, 510 N.E.2d 325, 330, 517 N.Y.S.2d 456,
461-62 (1987) (reasonable suspicion, not probable cause, is appropriate standard for drug testing of
teachers).
132. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337-38 (1985); Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F.
Supp. 1507, 1514 (D.N.J. 1986).
133. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337.
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drug tests also expose the use of legally prescribed medications, including
oral contraceptives and medication to treat physical and psychiatric conditions
previously recognized as within the traditional confidentiality of medical
records. 1 34 Drug testing also exposes otherwise private medical conditions,
including diabetes, epilepsy, urinary tract infections, venereal disease, and
35
pregnancy. 1
Second, drug tests necessarily scrutinize a broad array of off-duty
activities. As observed in American Federation of Government Employees v.
Weinberger,136 "[t]hese tests enable the individual or organization
administering them to monitor the off-duty conduct of employees, and
represent a technological advance that ... could threaten much of the privacy
1 37
most citizens now take for granted."'
Third, the manner in which urine specimens are obtained is quite
intrusive. Urination is a personal bodily function usually performed in
solitude. In fact, many municipal ordinances prohibit the act in public.' 3 8
Some testing programs require a government official's direct observation of
the act of urination to assure the accuracy of the test and to prevent
adulteration of the samples.' 39 Urination under the direct observation of
another "necessarily includes exposing one's private parts, an experience
140
which even if courteously supervised can be humiliating and degrading."'
Even if urine samples are not collected under direct observation, many
testing programs require at least indirect observation, which may be equally
134. See, e.g., Rushton v. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 844 F.2d 562, 566 (8th Cir. 1988);
Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136, 1144 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 577 (1986); Capua v. City
of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1515 (D.N.J. 1986); McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122, 1127
(D. Iowa 1985), aff'd as modified, 809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987). See also Drug Testing Hearings, supra
note 58, at 2 (statement of Representative Ackerman); id. at 39 (statement ofJames Pierce, President,
National Federation of Federal Employees).
135. Drug Testing Hearings, supra note 58, at 2, 39.
136. 651 F. Supp. 726 (S.D. Ga. 1986).
137. Id. at 732. See also Jones v. McKenzie, 833 F.2d 335, 339 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("Because drug
tests often furnish information about employee activities occurring outside of working hours, such
tests may provide Government officials with a periscope through which they can peer into an
individual's behavior in her private life, even in her own home."); Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F.
Supp. 1507, 1511 (D.N.J. 1986) (drug testing is "a form of surveillance" which "reports on a
person's off-duty activities just as surely as [if] someone had been present and watching").
138. See, e.g., National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 175 (5th Cir.
1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1072 (1988); Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1514
(D.Nj. 1986).
139. For examples of cases in which challenged testing programs required direct observation, see
Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, 647 F. Supp. 875 (E.D. Tenn. 1986), aff'd, 846 F.2d 1539 (6th Cir.
1988); Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986); Caruso v. Ward, 133 Misc. 2d
544, 506 N.Y.S.2d 789 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986), aff'd, 131 A.D.2d 214, 520 N.Y.S.2d 551 (N.Y. App. Div.
1987).
140. Caruso v. Ward, 133 Misc.2d 544, 548, 506 N.Y.S.2d 789, 793 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986), aff'd,
131 A.D.2d 214, 520 N.Y.S.2d 551 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987). See also National Treasury Employees
Union v. Von Raab, 649 F. Supp. 380, 387 (E.D. La. 1986), vacated, 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987), cert.
granted, 108 S. Ct. 1072 (1988); Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, 647 F. Supp. 875, 880 (E.D. Tenn.
1986), aff'd, 846 F.2d 1539 (6th Cir. 1988); Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1514
(D.N.J. 1986).
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embarrassing and insulting. 14 Regardless of whether testing requires any
observation, the experience of being forced to produce a urine sample at the
behest of an employer offends normal expectations of dignity. As one court
noted, "the very taking of the sample makes for a quite substantial intrusion
that could not be negated even if an employee were allowed to produce his
urine sample in the privacy of an executive washroom, with no observation
whatsoever."' 14 2 Drug tests have been described as more intrusive than a
search of the home; 143 equal to 14 4 or more intrusive 4 5 than a blood test; and
47
14 6
or even a body cavity search.1
equal to the intrusiveness of a strip search

In light of the private bodily information that drug testing can reveal, the
potential days of off-duty activity it can scrutinize, and the highly offensive and
degrading process of collecting the specimen itself, it is fair to conclude that
drug testing is a highly invasive search that requires a proportionally weighty
state interest to justify it.
D.

The Governmental Interests

The magnitude of the invasion upon individual liberties caused by drug
testing must be balanced against the governmental interests furthered by the
tests. Three distinct governmental interests have been advanced in support of
drug testing: (1) the identification of drug-using employees to further
efficiency and safety in the workplace; (2) the integrity of the particular
employment institution as perceived by the public; and (3) the enforcement of
the criminal laws against drug trade and use by reducing the demand for
illegal drugs. While these are certainly legitimate objectives of governmental
141. See, e.g., Taylor v. O'Grady, 669 F. Supp. 1422, 1434 (N.D. Il. 1987) ("Compelling an
individual to urinate at a particular time and place into a cup for subsequent chemical analysis can be
and was for [this plaintiff] an extreme intrusion and invasion into her most narrow sphere of personal
privacy."); American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Weiberger, 651 F. Supp. 726, 733-34 (S.D. Ga.
1986).
142. American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Weinberger, 651 F. Supp. 726, 734 (S.D. Ga. 1986).
143. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 649 F. Supp. 380, 386 (E.D. La. 1986),
vacated, 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1072 (1988).
144. See, e.g., Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1277 v. Sunline Transit Agency, 663 F. Supp.
1560, 1566 (C.D. Cal. 1987); American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Weinberger, 651 F. Supp. 726,
733 (S.D. Ga. 1986); Bostic v. McClendon, 650 F. Supp. 245, 249 (N.D. Ga. 1986); Tucker v. Dickey,
613 F. Supp. 1124, 1129 (D. Wis. 1985); McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122, 1127 (S.D. Iowa
1985), aff'das modified, 809 F.2d 1302, 1307 (8th Cir. 1987); Storms v. Coughlin, 600 F. Supp. 1214,
1218 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). But see McDonell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302, 1308 (8th Cir. 1987) ("Urinalysis
properly administered is not as intrusive as a strip search or a blood test.").
145. See, e.g., Storms v. Coughlin, 600 F. Supp. 1214, 1218 S.D.N.Y. 1984) ("In a way in which
having blood extracted could never be, being forced under threat of punishment to urinate into a
bottle held by another is purely and simply degrading."). Accord Tucker v. Dickey, 613 F. Supp. 1124,
1130 (1). Wis. 1985). See also Caruso v. Ward, 133 Misc. 2d 544, 547-48, 506 N.Y.S.2d 789, 792-93
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986), aff'd, 131 A.D.2d 214, 529 N.Y.S.2d 551 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987).
146. Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1514 (D.N.J. 1986). See also Caruso v. Ward,
133 Misc. 2d 544, 548, 506 N.Y.S.2d 789, 793 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986), aff'd, 131 A.D.2d 214, 520
N.Y.S.2d 551 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987). But see McDonell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302, 1308 (8th Cir.
1987).
147. See Tucker v. Dickey, 613 F. Supp. 1124, 1129-30 (D. Wis. 1985); Storms v. Coughlin, 600 F.
Supp. 1214, 1220 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). But see Turner v. Fraternal Order of Police, 500 A.2d 1005, 1009
(D.C. 1985) ("The intrusion of a urinalysis test requires a normal bodily function for this purpose.
This is not an extreme body invasion.").
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action, the fourth amendment question is not the legitimacy of the goals
themselves, but whether the goals properly may be achieved by means of drug
testing. Each of the asserted governmental interests must be examined
critically with this question in mind.
1.

The Safety/Efficiency Interest.

The governmental interest most commonly

advanced in support of drug testing is to increase efficiency and safety in the
workplace through detection of employees who use drugs on the job.

48

Mistakes made by drug-using employees may endanger themselves or others,
and under some circumstances, may result in the employer's liability. 1 49 But
while the governmental interest in efficiency and safety is an important one,
the extent to which drug testing promotes this interest is limited for three
reasons.
First, it is worthwhile to note that the safety/efficiency interest suggests a
great deal more than testing for illegal drugs. If the efficiency of the
workforce is the issue, employers should logically test for other influences that
affect efficiency. Recently, Representative Patricia Schroeder argued:
[I]f [efficiency and on-the-job performance] is the reason for the [proposed urine
testing], why did the Commission [on organized crime] not recommend testing for offduty use of the two most addictive and destructive drugs known to society-alcohol
and tobacco? Alcoholism has ruined the careers and families of hundreds of
thousands of Americans. As for smoking, the Surgeon General has documented that
cigarette smoking results in greater illness and use of sick leave. If our goal is to
regulate off-duty conduct which could hurt performance, alcohol and tobacco would
be prime candidates. 5I,0 however, along with most Americans, would find such
restrictions abhorrent. 1

Second, the governmental interest in safety varies greatly with the context.
The government has a significant safety interest in preventing the use of
drugs by employees whose drug use would ordinarily pose situations of grave
public danger, such as air traffic controllers and police officers. But this safety
148. The safety/efficiency interest has been duly noted in the cases: See, e.g., Lovvorn v. City of
Chattanooga, 846 F.2d 1539, 1544 (6th Cir. 1988) (firefighters); Railway Labor Executives Ass'n v.
Burnley, 839 F.2d 575, 586 (9th Cir.) (railway workers), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 2033 (1988); Rushton
v. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 844 F.2d 562, 564-65 (8th Cir. 1988) (nuclear power plant employees);
Jones v. McKenzie, 833 F.2d 335, 340 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (school bus attendants): National Treasury
Employees Union V.Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 178 (5th Cir. 1987) (customs workers), cert. granted, 108
S. Ct. 1072 (1988); McDonell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302, 1308 (8th Cir. 1987) (prison guards); Taylor
v. O'Grady, 669 F. Supp. 1422, 1425-26 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (prison guards); Sanders v. Washington
Metro. Area Transit Auth., 652 F. Supp. 765, 768-69 (D.D.C. 1986) (bus and subway drivers); Bostic
v. McClendon, 650 F. Supp. 245, 250 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (police officers): Turner v. Fraternal Order of
Police, 500 A.2d 1005, 1008 (D.C. 1985) (police officers); City of Palm Bay v. Bauman, 475 So. 2d
1322, 1326 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (police officers and firefighters).
149. See Barnard, Legal Implications of Drug Testing in the Private Sector, 2 J. L. & HEALTH 67, 67-69
(1987-88); Lewis, Drug Screening in the Public Sector: Municipalities and Government Workers, 2 J. L. &
HEALTH 39, 57-58 (1987-88).

150. Drug Testing Hearings, supra note 58, at 11 (statement of Representative Schroeder). See also
Wisotsky, supra, note 36, at 769-70 (Given that alcohol imposes more human and economic costs on
the workplace than illegal drug use, "it would take transcendental creativity to conclude that
programs of testing for illegal drug use that exclude alcohol are really directed toward policing the
productivity and safety of workers").
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interest is not significant in other contexts, where danger to life does not
result, as a matter of course, from the conduct of drug-using employees.' 5'
Third, the strength of the government's safety/efficiency interest depends
upon the extent to which employees now engage in drug use. If drug use is
widespread, then some additional efficiency and safety might be achieved by
drug testing. On the other hand, if no employees use drugs, then drug testing
will not enhance efficiency or safety at all. 152 The courts should not rest
content with the mere assertion that a drug problem exists; given the
intrusiveness of drug testing, the employer should be required to produce
53
evidence on the extent of employee drug use to justify drug testing.
151. See, e.g., American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Meese, 688 F. Supp. 547, 553 (N.D. Cal.
1988); Patchogue-Medford Congress of Teachers v. Board of Educ., 119 A.D.2d 35, 39, 505
N.Y.S.2d 888, 891 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986), aff'd, 70 N.Y.2d 57, 510 N.E.2d 325, 517 N.Y.S.2d 456
(1987).
152. This problem was presented quite strikingly by the district court in National Treasury
Employees Union v. Von Raab:
That the drug testing plan is not rationally related to the achievement of a legitimate
governmental interest is highlighted by the conspicuous absence of any statistics by the
Since Customs
defendant showing any drug problem whatsoever among federal workers ....
has not demonstrated a drug problem among its work force, the drug testing plan is an overly
intrusive scheme that bears no rational relationship to the protection of an endangered
governmental interest. The defendant simply has not shown that a legitimate governmental
interest has been threatened.
649 F. Supp. 380, 390 (E.D. La. 1986), vacated, 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct.
1072 (.1988); see also Odenheim v. Carstadt-East Rutherford Regional School Dist., 211 N.J. Super.
54, 61, 510 A.2d 709, 713 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1985) ("The raw numbers and percentages of students
referred to student assistance counseling as compared with the total student body is not reasonably
related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference, urinalysis, in the first place.").
153. Absent any evidence on the issue, one federal district court took judicial notice that "drug
use among prisoners is a serious, disruptive problem within American prisons." Storms v. Coughlin,
600 F. Supp. 1214, 1220 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). This appears quite close to the limits ofjudicial notice.
The Federal Rules of Evidence allow judicial notice of a fact only if it is "either (1) generally known
within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination
by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." FED. R. EviD. 201 (b). Even
if drug use among prisoners is generally known or capable of accurate and ready determination, drug
use among any class of employees cannot be determined as easily, and should not be the subject of
judicial notice.
With more thoughtful analysis, other courts have noted the state's failure to justify drug testing
with evidence of drug use among its employees. See, e.g., Taylor v. O'Grady, 669 F. Supp. 1422,
1426-30 (N.D. I1. 1987) (detailed discussion of statistical evidence presented in support of need to
test employees for illegal drug use); Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1277 v. Sunline Transit
Agency, 663 F. Supp. 1560, 1562 (C.D. Cal. 1987) ("The record does not disclose a single
documented case of alcohol or drug abuse by a public employee, nor does [the state] allege such use
has resulted in a bus accident."); American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Weinberger, 651 F. Supp.
726 (S.D. Ga. 1986) (mass drug testing of civilian police officers employed by the Army not justified
without reasonable suspicion where record disclosed "no evidence whatsoever" of drug problem
among officers); Penny v. Kennedy, 648 F. Supp. 815, 816 (E.D. Tenn. 1986) (mass drug testing of
police officers not justified by evidence of two police officers testing positive in 1985 for illegal drug
use, police chief's statement that 90% of department had no drug problem, officer's statement and
"rumors" regarding switched urine samples during 1985 testing, tip from FBI that an officer had
been in contact with a drug dealer, and pre-1985 statement from an officer who admitted using
marijuana that "several" other officers also used marijuana), aff'd, 846 F.2d 1563 (6th Cir. 1988);
Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, 647 F. Supp. 875, 882 (E.D. Tenn. 1986) (evidence that "several"
fire fighters tested positive and "some" switched urine samples during 1985 testing, without
"objective facts concerning deficient job performance or physical or mental deficiencies on the part
of [the city's] fire fighters, either in general or with respect to specific personnel" did not present
reasonable suspicion upon which mass testing could be based), aff'd, 846 F.2d 1539 (6th Cir. 1988);
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Without such evidence, ordering drug testing is "an act of pure bureaucratic
54
caprice."1
Even in those circumstances in which the employer has a strong safety and
efficiency interest in identifying drug users, the question remains whether
drug testing is a reasonable means of furthering that interest. As Judge Vietor
explained:
There is no doubt about it-searches and seizures can yield a wealth of information
useful to the searcher. (That is why King George III's men so frequently searched the
colonists.) That potential, however, does not make15a 5governmental employer's search
of an employee a constitutionally reasonable one.

Even where an employer is able to assert a strong safety/efficiency interest,
drug testing is both an over- and underinclusive means of advancing that
interest.
or when
whether
the test

Drug testing is overinclusive because the tests do not reveal
the illicit substance was ingested.' 56 Drug testing does not
an individual was intoxicated or impaired on the job or at
was given. 1 5 7 It does not indicate whether an individual

whether
indicate
the time
is drug-

dependent, a regular user, or likely to ingest the drug during working hours.
If employers discipline an employee based upon a positive urine test, the
58
In these
employer in effect regulates the employee's off-duty behavior.
respects, drug testing is no less overinclusive than random searches of
employees' homes or wire-taps placed on employees' phones.
Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1516 (D.N.J. 1986) ("The City of Plainfield proceeded
in its urine testing campaign without any specific information or independent knowledge that any
individual fire department employee was under the influence of drugs."); Patchogue-Medford
Congress of Teachers v. Board of Educ., 119 A.D.2d 35, 40, 505 N.Y.S.2d 888, 891 (N.Y. App. Div.
1986) ("[Tlhe appellants have failed to show an objective, factual basis for inferring that any one of
the subject teachers uses or has used illegal drugs."), aff'd, 70 N.Y.2d 57, 510 N.E.2d 325, 517
N.Y.S.2d 456 (1987); Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Newark, 216 N.J. Super. 461, 472-73, 524
A.2d 430, 436 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) ("In weighing the public need against the private
intrusion, the courts are persuaded by the absence of a factual showing that drug use is widespread
among the affected employees or that it presents an identifiable risk to the public."); Caruso v. Ward,
133 Misc. 2d 544, 551, 506 N.Y.S.2d 789, 795 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986) (evidence that 22 police officers
tested positive for drug use in force of over 26,000 could not support finding that drug use was more
than "a very occasional problem at best"), aff'd, 131 A.D.2d 214, 520 N.Y.S.2d 551 (N.Y. App. Div.
1987).
154. Patchogue-Medford Congress of Teachers v. Board of Educ., 119 A.D.2d 35, 40, 505
N.Y.S.2d 888, 891 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986), aff'd, 70 N.Y.2d 57, 510 N.E.2d 325, 517 N.Y.S.2d 456
(1987). Interestingly, a representative of the President's Commission on Organized Crime, which

proposed testing federal employees for illegal drug use, admitted that "[t]here is nothing to suggest
that the Federal work force is a particularly suspect group in terms of drug use." Drug Testing
Hearings, supra note 58, at 22 (testimony of Rodney G. Smith, Deputy Executive Director of the
President's Commission on Organized Crime). In fact, after President Reagan ordered the
development of drug testing programs for federal employees, officials from several federal agencies

described drug use as minimal and identified alcohol as a far greater menace to alertness and
productivity. Wisotsky, supra note 36, at 766. Despite the absence of empirical evidence of a drug
problem among federal employees, President Reagan rejected a recommendation by the Department
of Labor that a study be conducted to ascertain the extent of illegal drug use among federal workers.
Id.
155. McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122, 1130 (S.D. Iowa 1985), aff'd as modified, 809 F.2d

1302 (8th Cir. 1987).
156.
157.
158.

See supra notes 88-97 and accompanying text.
Id.
See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
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Drug testing to detect on-the-job drug use by employees is also an underinclusive means of advancing safety and efficiency, due to its inaccuracy.
Tests may be manipulated, and studies show that properly administered urine
tests have very high rates of false negatives.' 59 Even those employees who
have used drugs immediately prior to a test may not be detected.
Finally, drug testing is not only extremely overinclusive and somewhat
underinclusive, but also is not the least intrusive means of furthering the
governmental interest. A properly designed and implemented program of
employee supervision will in many contexts lead to the detection of virtually
all drug-using employees.' 60 Given that scientific studies are able to generate
statistical and scientific evidence of the absenteeism, mistakes, and health
problems caused by drug use,' 6 1 one wonders why employers do not simply
take disciplinary action against those employees who make more mistakes, are
frequently absent, or suffer from drug-related health problems? "Certainly
one so under the influence of drugs as to impair the performance of his or her
duties must manifest some outward symptoms ....,,t62 While it is possible
that an employee on drugs may escape detection for a while, risking injury to
himself or another, there is certainly no guarantee that drug testing would
63
prevent such an accident.1

Drug testing is a much more intrusive action than is necessary to serve the
governmental safety/efficiency interest. To the extent that it does so, it is
both over- and underinclusive. Accordingly, the governmental interest in
safety and efficiency in the workplace has only a marginal nexus with drug
testing.
2. The Integrity Interest. Wholly apart from the actual effects of drug use, the
government's ability to do its job may be impaired if the public perceives
governmental workers as drug users. Under this line of reasoning, the
imposition of drug testing will comfort the public and contribute to the
perception that public employees are drug-free. Because of this perception
the government arguably will be able to carry out its duties more effectively.
The strength of the integrity interest, like the safety/efficiency interest
discussed above, depends entirely upon context. Only in some employment
159. See supra notes 82, 86 & 99 and accompanying'text.
160. See, e.g., Taylor v. O'Grady, 669 F. Supp. 1422, 1432 (N.D. Ill. 1987) ("trained supervision
• . . can detect those who chronically abuse any type of drug and who are impaired at work");
Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1277 v. Sunline Transit Agency, 663 F. Supp. 1560, 1568 (C.D.
Cal. 1987) ("the Agency only employs 50 people and this small group can be monitored by a less
draconian program than that presented here").
161. See, e.g., R.T.I. STUDY, supra note 13, at 8-9.
162. Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1518 (D.N.J. 1986). A program of
supervision may also be a wise alternative to drug testing from an economic standpoint. Because
both EMIT screening and GC/MS confirmation are necessary to carry out a reliable drug testing
program, the projected monetary cost of implementing a drug testing program in the federal
workplace is staggering. It has been estimated that it will cost $265 to $295 million to test the entire
federal workforce for illegal drug use. Drug Testing Hearings,supra note 58, at 43 (statement of Robert
M. Tobias, President, National Treasury Employees Union).
163. See Lovvorn v.City of Chattanooga, 647 F. Supp. 875, 883 (E.D. Tenn. 1986), afftd, 846 F.2d
1539 (6th Cir. 1988).
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situations is the public's perception critical to the ability of an employee to do
his job effectively. The integrity interest is most commonly advanced as a
64
justification for testing law enforcement officers.'
The argument that the perceived use of drugs by law enforcement officers
will affect their ability to carry out their duties is attenuated at best. In the
absence of any empirical evidence to the contrary, it is equally plausible to
infer that most citizens obey law enforcement officers even if they have some
vague suspicion that some officers, although not necessarily the officers they
are dealing with, use illegal drugs. Furthermore, the establishment by way of
testing that law enforcement officers do not use drugs can only serve to
heighten respect for the officers to the extent that it is already perceived that
the officers use drugs. That is, if no one thinks law enforcement officers use
drugs, then confirming that they do not serves little purpose.16 5 Accordingly,
the mere assertion of an unfavorable public perception must not suffice to
trigger the government's integrity interest. To prove that drug testing is
needed to preserve the integrity of law enforcement officers, the government
must be required to make at least some evidentiary showing that perceived
drug use actually has compromised law enforcement integrity.
Even if the public actually perceives that its law enforcement officers use
illegal drugs, it is doubtful that drug testing will eliminate that perception.
Although it is true that drug testing may serve to comfort the public, this
comtbrting effect inevitably will be to some extent undermined by the report
of positive test results, which will likely receive a lot of attention and
strengthen the public's impression that the public employees are drug users.
The governmental interest in employee integrity does not exist in other
contexts where the performance of its employees is not affected by public
164. See, e.g., Bostic v. McClendon, 650 F. Supp. 245 (N.D. Ga. 1986). The Bostic court observed:
[A] police force is entrusted with the basic duty of keeping order and protecting the public
peace, an obligation which is fundamental to the preservation of society. To a considerable
degree, the ability of the police force to carry out this mandate depends on the public's respect
for and voluntary acquiescence to the legitimate authority of the individual officers.
Id. at 250. See also Taylor v. O'Grady, 669 F.Supp. 1422, 1425-26 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (state has "interest
in maintaining the public's perception of the integrity of correctional officers as law-abiding law
enforcement officials"); Feliciano v. City of Cleveland, 661 F. Supp. 578, 588 (N.D. Ohio 1987)
(testing police recruits for illegal drug use' defended as necessary "to preserve the integrity of the
department").
One public transportation employer also asserted that testing its employees for illegal drug use
was justified in part by "the promotion of its image and the resulting increased confidence by the
public." Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1277 v. Sunline Transit Agency, 663 F. Supp. 1560,
1569 (C.D. Cal. 1987). However, characterizing the public employer's safety/efficiency interest as
"paramount," id., the court did not discuss the employer's asserted integrity interest.
165. The court in Bostic v. McClendon, 650 F. Supp. 245 (N.D. Ga. 1986), apparently recognized
that only well-publicized narcotics violations by police officers may impair police integrity:
There is no doubt that the open violation of narcotics laws by officers serves to seriously
undermine the legitimacy of their moral authority to enforce these laws as to others, and erodes
the likelihood that the public will voluntarily support and acquiesce to the authority of those
officers. The open violation of narcotics laws by its officers does hinder the police department's
ability to effectively carry out its statutory responsibilities, and therefore the police department
does have a legitimate, if lesser, interest in preventing such off-duty conduct.
Id. at 250 (emphasis added).
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perception.' 66 In those areas of employment, the integrity interest should
67
never be allowed as a justification for drug testing.1
3. Policing Drug Use. The government occasionally asserts that it should be
permitted to conduct employee drug testing programs to advance its interest
in eliminating the use and trade of illegal drugs.' 68 While it may be true, at
the margin, that drug use and trade may be attacked by reducing demand for
drugs through employee drug testing, the extent to which demand and trade
may be reduced by drug testing is certainly speculative.' 6 9 The difficulty with
this justification for drug testing is that it presents no reason to stop with
public employees. ' 70 If the elimination of drug demand is the goal, then there
is no rational basis for testing only employees, let alone public employees. An
equal state interest would support random drug testing at roadway blockades,
election booths, street corners, and so on. Because there is no reason to
believe that public employees are more likely to support the drug trade than
any other citizen, random drug testing for this purpose limited to public
employees as a class raises profound equal protection problems. Government
cannot legitimately promote its interest in eliminating drug use and trade by
testing public employees only.

166. See, e.g., American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Meese, 688 F. Supp. 547, 554 (N.D. Cal.
1988). Law enforcement is arguably the only area of employment in which public perception has an
impact on the effectiveness of public employees.
167. See Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1519 (D.N.J. 1986). In Capua, the court
explained:
Clearly, no one can deny that the public has an interest in the integrity of its fire fighting forces.
Yet, the ability of fire fighters to perform their jobs is not dependent upon the public's
"perception" of this integrity ....
In other words, fire fighters can still continue to serve the
public effectively, even in the face of unpopular public "perception." For the municipality of
Plainfield then, it is not the demonstration of propriety that is essential but rather the
determination of job-related capability.
Id. at 1519.
168. Policing drug use is probably an implicit partial motivation for all drug testing plans, for
only this concern explains the plans' failure to test for other job-impairing influences. Elimination of
use and trade of illegal drugs was the primary motivation of the President's Commission on
Organized Crime in recommending mass drug testing for federal employees. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N
ON ORGANIZED CRIME, AMERICA'S HABIT: DRUG ABUSE, DRUG TRAFFICKING,

AND ORGANIZED CRIME

483 (1986). Only recently has the federal government asserted safety and efficiency as justifications
for such drug testing. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,564, 3 C.F.R. 224, 226 (1987), reprntedin 5 U.S.C.
§ 7301 app. at 32 (West Supp. 1987). Former Attorney General Edwin Meese impliedly admitted
that drug testing federal employees was intended at least in part to police drug use when he
explained to the United States Chamber of Commerce that "since most Americans work, the
workplace can be the chokepoint for halting drug abuse." N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1986, § 1, at 17, col.
3.
169. After reviewing this justification for drug testing, Representative Schroeder remained wholly
unconvinced: "Frankly, I think anyone who finds this logic persuasive ought to be a prime candidate
for drug testing." Drug Testing Hearings,supra note 58, at 11. Others shared Schroeder's sentiments.
See, e.g., id. at 36 (statement of Kenneth T. Blaylock, National President, American Fed'n of Gov't
Employees) ("after hearing Attorney General Meese's endorsement of this [drug testing] proposal,
we are concerned about the potential use of hallucinogenics at the Justice Department").
170. See American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Meese, 688 F. Supp. 547, 554 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
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Balancing the Competing Interests

After examining the intrusiveness of drug testing and the countervailing
state interests, courts must balance these competing values to arrive at the
appropriate level of suspicion or cause required to make the testing of an
individual employee reasonable under the fourth amendment. Unfortunately,
courts have given rather hasty treatment to this portion of the analysis,
arriving at results in a rather conclusory fashion. 17 1 While only a few courts
have allowed drug testing without any individualized suspicion,t 72 none have
gone so far as to require probable cause.' 73 Most of the courts have instead
74
held that "reasonable suspicion" is the constitutionally required standard.1
"Reasonable suspicion" is often defined as suspicion that is based on specific
objective facts and reasonable inferences that a particular employee has used
drugs on the job.' 75 That so many courts have adopted the reasonable
suspicion standard without any detailed analysis when confronted with many
different factual scenarios suggests that a spirit of compromise is in the air.
Though many courts oppose random testing plans, they do not want to
appear to promote employee drug use by requiring probable cause. The
lesser "reasonable suspicion" standard allows courts to stop random testing
programs while politically saving face. Because the governmental interests in
testing necessarily vary with the context, constitutional standards which
reflect these factual distinctions would be more analytically satisfying. The
171. See, e.g., National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987)
(recites balancing test, but does not accord any weight to individual privacy interests), cert. granted,
108 S. Ct. 1072 (1988).
172. Id.; Rushton v. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 844 F.2d 562 (8th Cir. 1988); McDonell v.
Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987); Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
107 S. Ct. 577 (1986); Mullholland v. Department of Army, 660 F. Supp. 1565 (E.D. Va. 1987);
Storms v. Coughlin, 600 F. Supp. 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
173. One federal district court prohibited drug testing of transportation employees except upon
a showing of probable cause. Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. 1500, 1508-09 (D.D.C. 1986). The
District of Columbia Circuit, however, reversed this holding on appeal. Jones v. McKenzie, 833 F.2d
335 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
174. See, e.g., McDonell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987); Taylor v. O'Grady, 669 F. Supp.
1422 (N.D. Ill. 1987); Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1277 v. Sunline Transit Agency, 663 F.
Supp. 1560 (C.D. Cal. 1987); Feliciano v. City of Cleveland, 661 F. Supp. 578 (N.D. Ohio 1987);
American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Weinberger, 651 F. Supp. 726 (S.D. Ga. 1986); Bostic v.
McClendon, 650 F. Supp. 245 (N.D. Ga. 1986); Penny v. Kennedy, 648 F. Supp. 815 (E.D. Tenn.
1986), aff'd, 846 F.2d 1563 (6th Cir. 1988); Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, 647 F. Supp. 875 (E.D.
Tenn. 1986), aff'd, 846 F.2d 1539 (6th Cir. 1988); Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507
(D.N.J. 1986); Patchogue-Medford Congress of Teachers v. Board of Educ., 70 N.Y.2d 57, 510
N.E.2d 325, 517 N.Y.S.2d 456 (1987); Caruso v. Ward, 131 A.D.2d 214, 520 N.Y.S.2d 551 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1987); Turner v. Fraternal Order of Police, 500 A.2d 1005 (D.C. 1985); City of Palm Bay v.
Bauman, 475 So. 2d 1322 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
175. See, e.g., McDonell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302, 1308 (8th Cir. 1987). Reasonable suspicion is
"individualized suspicion" in the sense that the particular employee's conduct makes it more likely
that he has used drugs than other employees. The reasonable suspicion standard has been criticized
as contentless and devoid of specific requirements that meaningfully restrain governmental action.

See, e.g., America's New Work Ethic?, supra note 80, at 908-12. The difficulty with the standard in
practice is that courts may be willing to find "reasonable suspicion" if the employer is able to
articulate any plausible basis for suspicion, rather than requiring the employer to demonstrate the
precise objective facts and inferences necessary to support the suspicion.

Page 253: Winter 1988]

DRUG TESTING AND PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT

authors offer the following framework as a rough guide to achieve a more
thoughtful balancing of interests.
When the governmental interest in integrity is irrelevant because the
public's perception of the institution does not affect its ability to function, and
when the governmental interest in safety is less important, as in situations
where drug use would not inevitably present public danger, the government
should not be allowed to test an employee for illegal drug use without probable
cause to believe that she uses illegal drugs on the job. In such a situation,
absent evidence of widespread drug use among employees, there is simply no
compelling reason to alter the probable cause standard.
When the government demonstrates a strong integrity interest, by proving
that (1) public perception is critical to the ability of the employees to perform
their functions, and (2) there is an accurate general public perception of drug
use among those employees, then the government should be allowed to test
an employee based on reasonable suspicion of drug use on the job. However,
courts must not accept mere assertions of unfavorable public perception.
Without proof that such a perception impairs the employee's performance,
drug testing is a remedy without a wrong.
Alternatively, when the government shows a strong safety interest by
demonstrating that employee drug use would as a matter of course present
situations of grave public danger, then the government should be permitted
to test an employee based upon reasonable suspicion. As with the integrity
interest, however, courts must require evidence of extensive employee drug
use on the job and accurate confirmatory test procedures. Without such
evidence, the government may advance its safety interest adequately by
76
implementing a well-designed program of supervision.'
Drug testing is so intrusive, over- and underinclusive, and of such limited
utility in detecting drug use on the job that testing without reasonable
suspicion must not be allowed under any circumstances.
F.

Consent?

Even if a testing program violates the fourth amendment, an employer
could attempt to obtain employee consent to the search. In several drug
testing programs challenged in the courts, employees were required to sign
77
consent forms before testing.'
There are two reasons why these consent forms may not validate an
otherwise unreasonable search. First, consent is not voluntary where each
employee knows that her refusal to consent will result in disciplinary action.
Second, even if employees signed the forms voluntarily, the government
176. See, e.g., Taylor v. O'Grady, 669 F. Supp. 1422, 1431-33 (N.D. Il. 1987).
177. See, e.g., American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Weinberger, 651 F. Supp. 726, 728-29 (S.D.
Ga. 1987); McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122, 1126 (S.D. Iowa 1985), aff'das modified, 809 F.2d
1302 (8th Cir. 1987); Caruso v. Ward, 133 Misc. 2d 544, 545-46, 506 N.Y.S.2d 789, 791 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1986), aft'd, 131 A.D.2d 214, 520 N.Y.S.2d 551 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987).
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should never be allowed to condition public employment upon the waiver of
constitutional rights.
Whether the consent of an employee is voluntary, and not the result of
duress or coercion, express or implied, is a question of fact to be determined
from all the circumstances. 1 78 The critical consideration in consent form
situations is what the employee reasonably believes will happen if she does
not sign the form. If it is obvious under the circumstances that disciplinary
action will result from a failure to sign the form, then clearly any decision to
9
sign results from coercion.17
Regardless of the voluntariness with which consent is given, the
government should not be permitted to require a waiver of fourth amendment
rights as a condition of public employment.' 80 If government could do this, it
could by the same reasoning require the relinquishment of other fundamental
rights. In Frost & Frost Trucking Company v. Railroad Commission, 181 the Supreme
Court observed:
If the state may compel the surrender of one constitutional right as a condition of its
favor, it may, in like manner, compel a surrender of all. It is inconceivable that
guarantees embedded in the18 2Constitution of the United States may thus be
manipulated out of existence.
83
The point is perhaps best captured by Judge Vietor in McDonell v. Hunter:1
"Advance consent to future unreasonable searches is not a reasonable condition
84
of employment." 1

G.

The Government As Employer

A separate but related argument that has been advanced in support of
drug testing is that the government in its role as employer, as contrasted with
its role as law enforcer, should be given the same latitude in dealing with its
employees as any other employer in the private sector. Upon first
examination this argument appears seductively simple and sound: Because
private employers generally may institute employee drug testing programs,
the government as employer arguably should be permitted to do the same.
Upon closer analysis, however, the argument is compelling only from the
government's

perspective;

from the

employee's

perspective, his fourth

178. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973).
179. Lower courts confronting the issue have concluded uniformly that consent given under
threat of disciplinary action is invalid because unduly coercive. See, e.g., Bostic v. McClendon, 650 F.
Supp. 245, 249 (N.D. Ga. 1986); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 649 F. Supp. 380,
387-88 (E.D. La. 1986), vacated, 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1072 (1988);
City of Palm Bay v. Bauman, 475 So. 2d 1322, 1324-25 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
180. This reasoning does not apply to a government requirement that job applicants consent to
drug testing. Testing job applicants, however, only marginally protects against drug use on the job
because such screening detects the use of drugs only during a brief period preceding the test. Ifjob
applicants are aware of a public employer's pre-employment testing policy, they may merely abstain
from drug use for a brief period prior to screening.
181. 271 U.S. 583 (1926).
182. Id. at 594.
183. 612 F. Supp. 1122 (S.D. Iowa 1985), aff'd as modified, 809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987).
184. Id. at 1131 (emphasis in original).
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amendment rights may depend upon whether his employer suspects him of
criminal activity. Nevertheless, several courts have adopted some form of the
"government-as-employer" rationale in upholding drug testing programs.
The courts' utilization of the rationale, however, has been analytically
confusing; some courts view the doctrine as rendering the fourth amendment
totally inapplicable to governmental searches for work-related misconduct
while others view the fourth amendment as applicable to such searches, but to
a lesser extent.
In Allen v. City of Marietta,185 for example, the court considered a fourth
amendment challenge by a public employee to a drug test imposed on
reasonable suspicion of drug use. The Allen court determined at the outset
that the drug test was a "search" within the meaning of the fourth
amendment.' 8 6 Further, the court recognized that "[g]overnment employees
do not surrender their fourth amendment rights merely because they go to
work for the government. They have as much of a right to be free from
warrantless government searches as any other citizens."'18 7 Nevertheless, the
court drew a distinction between governmental searches for evidence of crime
and searches for noncriminal work-related misconduct. 18 As to the latter
type of search, the court stated: "Because the government as employer has
the same rights to discover and prevent employee misconduct relevant to the
employee's performance of her duties [as a private employer], the employee
cannot really claim a legitimate expectation of privacy from searches of that
nature." 189 Although the Allen court stated that fourth amendment protection
extends to government employees, the logical result of its holding that
government employees have no reasonable expectation of privacy from
searches for work-related misconduct is that the fourth amendment does not
protect government employees from work-related searches. This is because
where there is no legitimate expectation of privacy to be free from a search,
there is no fourth amendment protection.' 9 0 Accordingly, the Allen court's
analysis, focusing on the government as employer's need to search, leads to
the conclusion that the fourth amendment has no application at all to searches
for employment-related misconduct. This holding would appear to be
squarely at odds with Supreme Court precedent, particularly the Court's
latest pronouncement in O'Connor v. Ortega 191 that "[s]earches and seizures by
government employers or supervisors of the private property of their
employees .

.

92
. are subject to the restraints of the Fourth Amendment."'

185. 601 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
186. The court felt that current law mandated its determination that a drug test amounted to a
fourth amendment search. Id. at 488-89.
187. Id. at 491.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. See supra note 120.
191. 107 S. Ct. 1492 (1987).
192. Id. at 1497.
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The government-as-employer argument was stated somewhat differently
in National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab. 193 In that case, the court
seemed to focus on the employee's need to be free from governmental
searches: "While the fourth amendment protects against invasions for civil as
well as criminal investigatory purposes, the needfor protection againstgovernmental
intrusion diminishes if the investigation is neither designed to enforce criminal laws nor
likely to be used to bring criminal charges against the person investigated."194 Under
the Fifth Circuit's view, the fourth amendment continues to apply to
governmental searches for work-related misconduct, but in a somewhat less
robust form.
At least two criticisms of this position may be made. First, it is entirely
unclear why the need to be free from searches "diminishes" where the search
is not intended to enforce criminal laws. It is equally plausible that a citizen's
"need" to be free from a search depends upon the intrusiveness of the search
itself, rather than upon whether the evidence sought is proscribed by a statute
instead of an employment regulation.
Second, it is unclear why the focus of inquiry should be on the employee's
"need for protection against governmental intrusion" rather than on the
government's needfor the intrusion. That is, the Von Raab court's proposition
seems no more inherently appealing than the proposition that "the need for
[the governmental intrusion itself] diminishes if the investigation is neither
designed to enforce criminal laws nor likely to be used to bring criminal
charges ... ."195 This is because it is difficult to classify the "need" for a
search (or to be free from one) by whether the object of the search is to be
used in civil or criminal proceedings. On the civil side, the government-asemployer may have a great need to discover whether an air traffic controller is
impaired by alcohol, whereas it may have little need to discover that he is
double parked. On the other hand, searching an employee's car for a murder
weapon will be of greater necessity than a search of the car for a box of pencils
taken from the office.
The civil/criminal distinction is equally unavailing when viewed from an
employee's perspective. Many employees would prefer to have a search yield
evidence of a minor criminal infraction than evidence causing their
employment to be terminated. As this brief discussion indicates, it is of little
help in determining the reasonableness of a search to focus on whether the
evidence sought to be obtained relates to criminal or civil matters.
Regardless of the manner in which the government-as-employer theory is
applied, however, it rests upon an extremely problematic interpretation of the
fourth amendment. The doctrine makes sense, if at all, only from the
perspective of the government. 1 96 From an employee's perspective, the
193.
194.
Power
195.
196.
hollow

816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1072 (1988).
Id. at 179 (emphasis added). This reasoning was also adopted in Rushton v. Nebraska Pub.
Dist., 844 F.2d 562, 566-67 (8th Cir. 1988).
Cf Von Raab, 816 F.2d at 179.
Occasionally, the distinction between government as employer and as law enforcer is a
one, even from the government's point of view. Where evidence obtained by the government
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theory allows fourth amendment protections "to fluctuate with the 'intent' of
the invading officers."' 19 7 If an employee is subjected to a drug test because
he is suspected of criminal activity, the test is illegal. But if a test is
administered merely to evaluate his fitness for a job, the same urine test is
legal. Clearly, this turns the fourth amendment on its head. As the Supreme
Court commented in Camara v. Municipal Court,198 "It is surely anomalous to
say that the individual and his private property are fully protected by the
Fourth Amendment only when the individual is suspected of criminal
behavior."1 99
This anomaly should be foreclosed by the language of the amendment
itself. As Justice Brennan noted:
The Amendment states its own purpose, the protection of the privacy of the individual
and of his property against the incursions of officials: the "right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects." Like most of the Bill of Rights it
was not designed to be a shelter for criminals, but a basic protection for everyone; to
be sure, it must be upheld when asserted by criminals, in order that20it0 may be at all
effective, but it "reaches all alike, whether accused of crime or not."

H.

Administrative Searches

Several courts have upheld the drug testing of public employees under the
administrative search exception to the warrant requirement. 2oi This
exception is based upon a line of Supreme Court decisions allowing
warrantless searches of commercial premises in closely regulated
industries.2 0 2 In these decisions the Court has recognized significant state
20
interests in regulating industries such as coal mining,

firearms sales, 20 4

junkyards, 20 5 and the sale of alcoholic beverages. 20 6 Because such regulation
as employer is handed over to the government's law enforcement branch for use in a criminal
prosecution, the distinction between the government's roles evaporates, and employee's rights are
circumvented.
197. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 255 (1960) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
198. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
199. Id. at 530.
200. Abel, 362 U.S. at 254-55 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
201. See, e.g., Policeman's Benevolent Ass'n v. Township of Washington, 850 F.2d 133, 141 (3d
Cir. 1988); Rushton v. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 844 F.2d 562, 566-67 (8th Cir. 1988); National
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 179-80 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S.Ct.
1072 (1988); McDonell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302, 1308 (8th Cir. 1987); Shoemaker v. Handel, 795
F.2d 1136, 1142-43 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 577 (1986). But see Lovvorn v. City of
Chattanooga, 846 F.2d 1539, 1545-46 (6th Cir. 1988); Penny v. Kennedy, 846 F.2d 1563 (6th Cir.
1988); Railway Labor Executive Ass'n v. Burnley, 839 F.2d 575, 585 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 108 S.Ct.
2033 (1988); American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Weinberger, 651 F. Supp. 726, 734-35 (S.D. Ga.
1986); Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1518-19 (D.N.J. 1986).
202. New York v. Burger, 107 S.Ct. 2636 (1987) (junkyards); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594
(1981) (coal mining); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (firearms); Colonnade Catering
Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970) (alcoholic beverages).
203. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981).
204. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
205. New York v. Burger, 107 S.Ct. 2636, 2646 (1987).
206. Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 75, 76 (1970). The Colonnade Court
held that "Congress has broad power to design such powers of inspection under liquor laws as it
deems necessary to meet the evils at hand." Id. at 76. (However, the Court also held that "[u]nder the
existing statutes, Congress selected a standard that does not include forcible entries without a
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tends to reduce expectations of privacy, the Court has allowed warrantless
searches of commercial property where authorized by specific statutory
authority. 20 7 The Court has made it clear, however, that the exception does
not excuse warrantless searches of personal property outside of the
commercial context, especially warrantless searches of private homes. In
Donovan v. Dewey, 20 the Court explicitly distinguished searches of private
residences from searches of commercial premises for purposes of the
20 9
administrative search exception.
The Court's most recent case on administrative searches, New York v.
Burger,2 10 set forth three criteria which must be met in order for a warrantless
search of commercial premises to be permissible. There must be a
"substantial" government interest supported by the regulatory scheme
permitting the search; "warrantless inspections must be 'necessary to further
[the] regulatory scheme;' " and "the statute's inspection program, in terms of
the certainty and regularity of its application, [must] provid[e] a
constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant." 21 ' The Court has also
required a nexus between the purposes for the regulation and the interests
involved in the search,2 1 2 although it did not articulate it as a formal criterion.
On its face, the administrative search exception to the warrant
requirement does not apply to bodily searches of public employees. The
Court has taken great pains to explicitly limit the doctrine to searches of
commercial property.21 3 Nevertheless, several courts have extended the
doctrine to apply to drug testing employees in regulated industries. 21 4 In
effect, these courts have taken a relatively narrow doctrine permitting
warrantless searches of commercial property in a few historically and
pervasively regulated industries and applied it to highly intrusive bodily fluid
searches of individual employees who work in regulated industries. There is
little that can be said about this development except that it represents a
warrant.") Id. at 77 (emphasis added). The Court's decision resulted in the return and the
suppression (as evidence) of liquor seized in the warrantless search. See id. at 72, 77.)
207. See cases cited supra note 202.
208. 452 U.S. 594 (1981).
209. Id. at 598-99. The Court observed:
Our prior cases have established that the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable
searches applies to administrative inspections of private commercial property. However, unlike
searches of private homes, which generally must be conducted pursuant to a warrant in order to
be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, legislative schemes authorizing warrantless
administrative searches of commercial property do not necessarily violate the Fourth
Amendment. The greater latitude to conduct warrantless inspections of commercial property
reflects the fact that the expectation of privacy that the owner of commercial property enjoys in
such property differs significantly from the sanctity accorded an individual's home ....
Id. (citations and footnote omitted); see also New York v. Burger, 107 S. Ct. 2636, 2642 (1987).
210. 107 S. Ct. 2636 (1987).
211. Id. at 2644 (quoting Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 600 (1981)).
212. Id. at 2643 ("[tjhe [administrative search] doctrine is essentially defined by 'the
pervasiveness and regularity of the federal regulation' and the effect of such regulation upon an owner's
expectation of privacy.") (emphasis added).
213. See supra note 209.
214. See cases cited supra note 201.
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radical departure from precedent. 2 15 The Sixth Circuit has noted this point
quite forcefully:
To allow widespread mandatory drug testing of individuals by analogizing it to the
relaxed standards governing the less intrusive searches of places allowed under the
administrative search warrant exception fundamentally misapprehends that doctrine.
Given the origins of the administrative search warrant exception, it seems
incredible that
the argument in favor of mandatory drug testing should be based on
2 16
this doctrine.

The application of the administrative search doctrine to bodily searches is
particularly unfortunate in view of the relaxation of the doctrine itself in
Burger. There, the Court found a "substantial" state interest in the regulation
ofjunkyards. 2 17 Warrantless searches were considered necessary to further
the regulatory scheme because a warrant requirement might impair the
"surprise" found crucial to the Court in order to enforce the regulatory
scheme. 21 8 Finally, the Court found that the regulatory scheme provided a
"constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant." 21 9 As Justice Brennan
noted in his dissent, however, the only real restriction on the searches was
that they must occur during the business hours of junkyards. 22 0 That the
215. Perhaps the most egregious of these cases is Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136, 1142-43
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 577 (1986). In that case, the Third Circuit applied the administrative
search exception to uphold random warrantless drug testing of race horse jockeys in New Jersey.
The court found that the regulatory scheme including the drug testing served two strong state
interests: "protection of the wagering public," id. at 1142, and "protection of the wagering public's
confidence in the integrity of the industry," id. Moreover, the court found that the pervasive
regulation of the horse racing industry reduced jockeys' justifiable privacy expectations. Id. The
court reached this conclusion by observing that "[elven before the [drug testing] regulations
challenged here were adopted, the jockeys were aware that the Commission had promulgated
regulations providing for warrantless searches of stables." Id.
Aside from the fact that Shoemaker extended the administrative search exception to searches of
individuals, several criticisms of the case may be made. First, the court failed to inquire whether
there was any nexus between the regulation in the industry and the privacy expectations of those to
be searched. Although the jockeys were on notice that warrantless searches of stables might occur to
prevent the use of drugs in the horses, none of the regulations prior to the drug testing suggested
that the jockeys' persons might be subject to search. The jockeys' expectations of privacy in the act
of urination were in no way reduced by any of the regulations in the industry.
Second, it is questionable whether the interests at stake in Shoemaker were sufficiently weighty to
warrant the drug testing regulations. There was no evidence that the horse racing industry's public
image was tainted by perceived drug use among jockeys; the court simply accepted the state's
asserted need for testing to ensure the industry's integrity. There was similarly no evidence of what
effect, if any, the use of drugs by the jockeys might have had.
Since Shoemaker, it has become commonplace for a public employer to defend a challenged drug
testing program with the argument that its need for drug-free employees is at least as great as the
New Jersey Racing Commission's need for drug-free jockeys. See, e.g., McDonell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d
1302, 1308 (8th Cir. 1987); Rushton v. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 653 F. Supp. 1510, 1524 (D. Neb.
1987), aff'd, 844 F.2d 562 (8th Cir. 1988); American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Weinberger, 651

F. Supp. 726, 734 (S.D. Ga. 1987); National Ass'n of Air Traffic Specialists v. Dole, No. A87-073, slip
op. (D. Alaska Mar. 27, 1987). The ease with which this argument may be advanced in support of
virtually any challenged testing program suggests that the Shoemaker court failed to analyze New
Jersey's asserted interests critically.
216. Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, 846 F.2d 1539, 1545-46 (6th Cir. 1988).
217. 107 S.Ct. at 2646.
218. Id.at 2647-48.
219. Id. at 2648.
220. Id. at 2655 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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search actually conducted was unrelated to the administrative regulations that
initially justified the search, but rather was aimed at criminal law enforcement,
was not viewed as a sufficient difficulty to remove the search from the
22
administrative search exception. '
In the wake of Burger, it becomes clear that almost any regulatory scheme
may validly authorize a warrantless search as long as the legislature is able to
articulate some plausible significant interest and at least one restriction on the
time, place, and scope of the authorized searches. Moreover, the search will
not be objectionable merely because its sole purpose is criminal law
enforcement. As Justice Brennan observed, "[t]he implications of the Court's
opinion, if realized, will virtually eliminate Fourth Amendment protection of
commercial entities in the context of administrative searches." 22 2 Applying
the administrative search doctrine to bodily searches of individual employees
will have the further effect of virtually eliminating fourth amendment
protection of individuals employed in commercial entities. The implications
of this result may be to allow a legislature to effectively abrogate much of
traditional fourth amendment protection by regulatory fiat.
I.

The Supreme Court Docket: Von Raab and Burnley-Cert. Granted

The Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari on two drug testing
cases in which the Fifth and Ninth Circuits reached dramatically different
conclusions. These cases merit individual treatment because they will frame
the issues for the Court's first look at the fourth amendment implications of
drug testing public employees.
1. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab. In Von Raab, the National
Treasury Employees Union brought suit against the Commissioner of the
United States Customs Service on behalf of Customs Service employees to
enjoin the implementation of a drug testing program. The Customs Service is
primarily engaged in enforcing import, customs, and related laws, including
the interdiction of narcotics smuggling. 2 23 The drug testing program
involved is somewhat unusual in that it applies only to those employees who
2 24
apply for and are selected for promotion to certain covered positions.
Those employees who are selected for promotion are given at least five days'
2 25
notice of the date on which they will be required to submit a urine sample.
The urine specimens are collected under supervision, but not direct
observation. 2 26 The specimens are first tested by EMIT, then any positive
results are confirmed by a GC/MS test. 22 7 Those employees who refuse to
221.

Id.

Id. at 2657 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
223. 816 F.2d 170, 173 (5th Cir. 1987).
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.at 174.
227. Id. If the EMIT and GC/MS tests prove positive, the employee may designate an
independent laboratory also to test the specimen. Id.
222.
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submit to the test forfeit their right to promotion, 22 8 and those who test
22 9
positive are subject to dismissal.
The Customs Service justified the program by reference to the role of the
Service in narcotics interdiction and the possibility that illegal drug use by
Service employees would "undermine[] .

.

. the integrity of the Service." 23 0

Perhaps most significantly, as the Fifth Circuit noted,
[t]he Customs Service did not attempt to justify drug screening on the ground that it
suspected a significant level of drug use among its employees. Indeed, the
Commissioner has described the Service as "largely drug free," and, in five months of
testing, none of the tests of current employees seeking a job change was positive.
23
Even among applicants not already employed, only one person's test was positive. '

The district court enjoined the drug testing plan, finding it "utterly
repugnant to the United States Constitution" for a variety of reasons. 23 2 The
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, concluding that the drug
testing plan was constitutional. 23 3 Although the court found that the drug
tests were searches within the meaning of the fourth amendment, 23 4 the court
concluded that the searches were reasonable in view of the governmental
interests at stake.2 3 5 The court was not bothered by the absence of any
evidence of drug use among Customs Service employees. In its view, "[i]t is
not unreasonable to set traps to keep foxes from entering hen houses even in
the absence of evidence of prior vulpine intrusion or individualized suspicion
that a particular fox has an appetite for chickens." 23 6 The court also found
support for its conclusion by reference to the government's role as an
employer, 2 3 7 the fact that only those who apply for a promotion are subject to
testing, 2 38 the noncriminal nature of the search, 23 9 and the case law
240
permitting administrative searches of closely regulated industries.
228.

Id. at 173.

229. Neal, Mandatory Drug Testing, 74 A.B.AJ. 58, 60 (Oct. 1988).
230. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 173 (5th Cir. 1987).
231. Id.
232. 649 F. Supp. 380, 391 (E.D. La. 1986). The district court found that the drug testing
program violated the fourth amendment, the self-incrimination clause of the fifth amendment,
penumbral privacy rights, as well as due process of law.
233. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987).
234. Id. at 175-76. In this context, the court noted that "[t]here are few activities in our society
more personal or private than the passing of urine." Id.
235. Id. at 176-80. Although the court began its analysis of the reasonableness of the drug test
searches by reciting the Bell v. Wolfish balancing test, see supra note I 10, it is questionable whether the
court in fact applied it. Rather than balancing the governmental interests against the individual
interests at stake, the court appears to have simply listed the governmental interests and then found
them compelling. As one court noted, "[it is not surprising, given that the court can identify only
factors favoring testing, that it concludes that testing is constitutionally permissible as a reasonable
search." Feliciano v. City of Cleveland, 661 F. Supp. 578, 592 (N.D. Ohio 1987).
236. Von Raab, 816 F.2d at 179. The notion that chickens are to foxes what drugs are to Customs
Service employees seems belied by the uncontroverted evidence that even before drug testing the
Customs employees were largely drug free.
237. Id. at 178-79; see supra notes 185-200 and accompanying text.
238. Von Raab, 816 F.2d at 178.
239. Id. at 179; see supra notes 193-200 and accompanying text.
240. Von Raab, 816 F.2d at 179-80; see supra notes 201-22 and accompanying text.
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2. Railway Labor Executives Association v. Burnley. In Burnley, the Railway
Labor Executives Association brought suit to enjoin the implementation of a
drug and alcohol testing program promulgated by the Federal Railroad
Administration (FRA) as violative of the fourth amendment. 24 1 The FRA
initiated the program in 1985 through regulations requiring all members of a
railroad crew to be tested after any major train accident, impact accident, or
regulations also authorize the
fatal accident involving the crew. 2 4 2 The
2 43
railroads to test employees for "cause."
FRA defended the program by producing evidence of drug and alcoholrelated accidents during a nine year period preceding the initiation of the
program. 24 4 FRA also submitted evidence of the dangers involved in railroad
transport of hazardous materials. 2 4 5 The district court found the program
satisfactory under the fourth amendment and granted summary judgment in
2 46
favor of FRA.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the
portions of the program permitting drug testing in the absence of reasonable
suspicion violated the fourth amendment. 24 7 The court first held that the
drug tests were searches under the fourth amendment, but that a warrant
would not be required. 24 8 Next, the court declined FRA's invitation to apply
the administrative search doctrine to the drug testing program. 249 Balancing
241. 839 F.2d 575 (9th Cir. 1988). The Railway Labor Executives Association also asserted
several statutory grounds for injunctive relief that are not relevant to the fourth amendment issues in
the case.
242. Major train accidents are defined as those involving a fatality, release of hazardous material
with either evacuation or reportable injury, or $500,000 damage to railroad property. Impact
accidents include those involving a reportable injury or $50,000 damage to railroad property. 49
C.F.R. § 219.201 (1987).
243. 49 C.F.R. § 219.301- .309 (1987). Cause can be established in three different ways: by
reasonable suspicion, by an accident, or by a violation of certain operating rules. Reasonable
suspicion that constitutes cause for a urine test is established when at least two supervisors have an
articulable suspicion that an employee is currently under the influence of or impaired by alcohol or
drugs based on the supervisor's personal observation of the employee's appearance, behavior,
speech, or body odors. 49 C.F.R. § 219.301 (c)(2) (1987). One of the two supervisors possessing
articulable suspicion must have received at least three hours of training in detecting drug
intoxication.
244. Burnley, 839 F.2d at 579.
245. Id.
246. Id.at 577.
247. Id. at 588-89.
248. Id. at 582-83.
249. Id. at 584-85. See supra notes 201-22 and accompanying text. Specifically, the court noted
that "[a]ll of the decisions in this line of cases have upheld warrantless searches of property, not of
persons, and we decline to make such an extension in this case." Burnley, 839 F.2d at 584. Later in
the court's opinion, however, it waffled somewhat on this point. After noting that the administrative
search exception was particularly inapplicable to this case because the regulation in the industry had
not reduced the employees' expectations of privacy in their urine, the court wrote: "Thus we
conclude that the administrative inspection standard, which allows warrantless searches of the
premises of pervasively regulated industries, is not applicable to searches of persons even when they
are employed in those industries, unless the employees are the principalconcern of the industry regulation." Id.
at 585 (emphasis added). Thus, there is some ambiguity in the opinion about how the court would
view a case in which the employees were the principal concern of the regulations, such as a drug
testing program involving police officers. Cf Policeman's Benevolent Ass'n of New Jersey v.
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the governmental and individual interests involved, the court concluded that
2
testing in the absence of reasonable suspicion was unreasonable. 5
3. Von Raab and Burnley in the Supreme Court. Although at the court of
appeals level drug testing was upheld in Von Raab and struck down in Burnley,
Von Raab presents a much weaker case. In Von Raab, the only governmental
interest assertedly supported by the drug testing program is the integrity of
the Customs Service employees. 2 51 The uncontroverted evidence in the
record, however, is that the Customs Service employees are largely drug
free. 25 2 There is also no evidence in the record that the integrity of the

Customs Service has been called into question by any public perception of
drug use among its employees. As a result, the extent to which drug testing
will further the governmental interests involved is surely minimal. 2 53 The
nexus between the tests and the government's integrity interest is further
attenuated by the fact that nearly all of those employees who do use illegal
drugs will go undetected by the tests because the employees are given at least
five days' notice of the testing date. 254 As a result, there is little if any
connection between the drug testing program and the asserted justifications
for it; the program is pointless and unnecessary. The only helpful aspect of
the program in Von Raab is that only those who apply for a promotion to
certain positions are subject to the tests. 25 5 The program thus has a flavor of
voluntariness lacking in programs which randomly test the entire workforce.
This factor cannot justify an otherwise impermissible drug testing program,
however, because it would permit the government to attach an
unconstitutional condition to the Customs Service employees' ability to seek
promotion. 2 56 This aspect of the case also highlights in a rather ironic way the
Township of Washington, 850 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1988) (drug testing of police officers permissible
under administrative search doctrine).
250. Burnley, 839 F.2d at 588-89. The court framed its inquiry into the reasonableness of the
search in terms of the two pronged test articulated by the Supreme Court in O'Connor v. Ortega:
(1) whether the search was justified at its inception, and (2) whether the search was reasonably
related in scope to the justifications for the search. Id. at 587; see supra notes 113-17 and
accompanying text. The court then concluded that drug testing was "justified at its inception" only
where there is individualized suspicion of drug use. 839 F.2d at 587. The court reached this
conclusion, however, only after noting that the drug tests involved searches of persons, id., and the
privacy interests implicated by the tests were more than minimal, id. at 588. Thus, as noted supra
note 116 and accompanying text, the 'justified at its inception" test was applied only by
simultaneously considering the scope and intrusiveness of the search. The case is therefore an
example of the lack of utility of the O'Connor 'justified at its inception" standard. In the end, a search
is "justified at its inception" when it is "justified," and whether a search is "justified" or not is a
question that can only be answered by balancing the competing interests at stake.
251. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
252. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
253. See generally supra notes 164-67 and accompanying text.
254. The only drugs detectable more than five days after their use are some types of barbiturates,
extremely powerful doses of methaqualone, and cannaboids (marijuana) in the body of a chronic
user. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. Although it is possible that some employees will be
so addicted to drugs that they will be unable to abstain for five days, many of these employees may be
detectable by physical observation.
255. See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 180-84 and accompanying text.
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pointlessness of drug testing employees in general: here, only those
employee§ selected for promotion, those who by definition have proven
themselves to be outstanding employees, are subjected to drug testing. Von
Raab should be reversed.
In contrast to Von Raab, the drug testing program at issue in Burnley is
more directly supported by the significant state interest of safety and
efficiency among railroad employees. There is at least some evidence in the
record of drug use among employees, and of prior drug-related accidents.
The evidence does not reveal, however, the extent of drug use among the
employees. Furthermore, the program does not appear to tailor the drug test
to those employees whose use of drugs would cause the danger to be
prevented. Nevertheless, the Court should probably affirm the decision in
Burnley because the governmental interests at stake are significant, and could
be furthered by drug tests based upon reasonable suspicion without unduly
intruding upon the privacy rights of employees.
IV
DRUG TESTING AND PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS

In addition to the fourth amendment issues discussed above, drug testing
may under some circumstances be limited by procedural due process
concerns. Section one of the fourteenth amendment provides in relevant part
that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due
process of law. ' '2 57 The fifth amendment similarly restrains the federal
government. 2 58 The due process clause protects against arbitrary deprivation
25 9
of both property and liberty interests.
A.

Protected Property Interests

Since the early 1970's, the Supreme Court has recognized that public
employees who have protected property interests in continued government
employment may not be terminated without due process of law. 2 60 For a

public employee to claim a property interest protected by the due process
clause, he must show a legitimate claim of entitlement to continued
employment. 2 6' In one way or another, these entitlements ensure that
termination decisions are made only for some form of cause. Such claims of
entitlement are "not created by the Constitution, 'they are created and their
dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an
independent source such as state law.' "262
257. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
258. See id. at V, cl. 3.
259. Wells v. Doland, 711 F.2d 670, 675 (5th Cir. 1983).
260. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593
(1972).
261. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
262. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538 (1985) (quoting Board of Regents
v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)). Due process protects only current public employees, not
applicants for positions. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 576-77; Anderson v. City of Philadelphia, 845 F.2d
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Under this rationale, the Supreme Court has found statutes, 263 informal
practices or customs, 2 64 and statements in employee handbooks 26 5 sufficient

to create property interests in continued public employment. Every court
examining this issue in drug testing cases has found that public employees
possess
protected
property
interests
in
continued
government
26 6
employment.
When an independent rule or understanding confers upon a public
employee a property interest in continued government employment, he may
not be terminated without due process. 2 6 7 The second step in due process
analysis requires one to determine the process that is due the employee. 26 8 A
legislature may decide not to confer a property interest in public employment
at all, but once it does, it may not authorize deprivation of that property
269
interest without proper procedural safeguards.
Determining the procedural safeguards required to meet the due process
clause is a federal constitutional issue resolved by the courts.2 70 In Cleveland
Board of Education v. Loudermill, the Supreme Court explicitly held that public
employees with property interests in continued employment have a due
process right to some type of pre- or post-termination hearing. 2 7 1 The Court
held that due process requires that the employee be provided "oral or written
notice of the charges against him, an explanation of the employer's evidence,
and an opportunity to present his side of the story," usually at a pretermination hearing. 27 2 The pre-termination hearing need not be elaborate,

but it should determine "whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that
the charges against the employee are true and support the proposed
2 73
action."
Thus, before government may terminate a public employee based upon a
positive drug test result, it must at a minimum provide the employee with
notice of the charges against him, an explanation of the evidence, and an
opportunity to contest the evidence at a pre-termination hearing. Because
1216, 1220-21 (3d Cir. 1988) (applicants for city police and prison officer positions do not have
legitimate claims of entitlement to employment which invoke the protections of the due process
clause); see also Comment, Entitlement, Enjoyment, and Due Process of Law, 1974 DUKE L.J. 89, 101-02.
263. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 539 (1985).
264. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 602-03 (1972).
265. Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482, 492 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
266. See infra notes 276-77.
267. Cleveland Bd. of Educ, v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985).
268. Id.at 541.
269. Id. (quoting Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 167 (1974)).
270. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541-42.
271. Id. at 542 and n.7.
272. Id. at 546. The Court described " 'the root requirement' of the Due Process Clause as being
that an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any significant
property interest.' " Id. at 542 (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971)) (emphasis
in Boddie). Although due process ordinarily requires a pre-termination hearing, in certain limited
cases a post-deprivation hearing will suffice. Id. at 542 n.7. See Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry,
Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950).
273. Id. at 545-46.
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some drug tests may be quite inaccurate, 274 it is especially important that
employees be afforded a meaningful opportunity to challenge positive test
2 75
results prior to termination.

Several courtg have considered whether terminations or other adverse
disciplinary actions pursuant to positive test results have accorded employees
sufficient procedural due process. Some have held that adequate due process
was given, 2 76 while others have held that testing programs followed by
subsequent disciplinary actions violated due process. 2 7 7 In light of the clearer
and enhanced procedural due process rights accorded public employees in
Loudermill,2 7 8 due process challenges to terminations based upon positive
drug test results may meet with greater success in the future.
B.

Protected Liberty Interests

In addition to property interests in continued government employment,
public employees have constitutionally protected liberty interests in their
reputation and good name. The Supreme Court has rejected the claim "that
reputation alone, apart from some more tangible interests such as
employment, is either 'liberty' or 'property' by itself sufficient to invoke the
procedural protection of the Due Process clause." ' 2 79 However, an injury to
reputation that occurs when government alters a more tangible interest such
as an interest in employment 280 or a legal right or status 2 8 1 clearly implicates
"liberty" and requires due process.
274. See supra notes 70-104 and accompanying text.
275. See, e.g., Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1521 (D.N.J. 1986).
276. See, e.g., Bostic v. McClendon, 650 F. Supp. 245, 251 (N.D. Ga. 1986); Lovvorn v. City of
Chattanooga, 647 F. Supp. 875, 883 (E.D. Tenn. 1986), aft'd, 846 F.2d 1539 (6th Cir. 1988);
Shoemaker v. Handel, 619 F. Supp. 1089, 1105 (D.N.J. 1985), aff'd, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir.) (issue
not argued on appeal), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 577 (1986); Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482,
494 (N.D. Ga. 1985). It must be noted that Allen was decided prior to the Supreme Court's decision
in Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985). In Allen, public employees with
property interests in continued employment were dismissed without a pre-termination hearing for
suspected illegal drug use. 601 F. Supp. at 492. Nevertheless, the court held that the dismissals
comported with due process because a city ordinance provided that employees could be dismissed
immediately for certain conduct threatening health or safety. Id. at 493. In light of Loudermill, this
decision is probably erroneous. Loudermill establishes that simply because the government creates a
property interest in continued employment does not mean that it can also define the requisite due
process to be accorded that interest. 470 U.S. at 541. The U.S. Constitution defines the process that
is due and the Loudermill court firmly rejected the "bitter with the sweet approach [as]
The right to due process 'is conferred, not by
misconceiv[ing] the constitutional guarantee ....
legislative grace, but by constitutional guarantee.' " Id. (quoting Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134,
167 (1974)). See Bible, supra note 78, at 342-47.
277. See, e.g., Everett v. Napper, 833 F.2d 1507, 1512 (1 1th Cir. 1987) (even though plaintiff
received notice and an adequate pre-termination hearing, violation of due process occurred because
he was suspended without pay); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 649 F. Supp. 380,
390 (E.D. La. 1986) (drug testing plan so unreliable as to violate due process), vacated, 816 F.2d 170
(5th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1072 (1988); Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507,
1521-22 (D.N.J. 1986); Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F.Supp. 1500, 1504-07 (D.D.C. 1986) (denial of
procedural due process particularly egregious because plaintiff terminated without hearing on basis
of two unconfirmed EMIT tests), revd in part on other grounds, 833 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
278. 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
279. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976).
280. Id. at 709-10.
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The liberty protected by the due process clause encompasses an
individual's freedom to work and earn a living,28 2 and an individual may have
constitutionally protected liberty interests even if she does not have a
property interest in continued employment.2 83 A public employer implicates
an employee's due process liberty interests when, in discharging her, the
employer makes charges which stigmatize or seriously damage the standing of
the employee in the community, making it difficult for her to take advantage
28 4
of other employment opportunities.
In order to prove a deprivation of constitutionally protected liberty
interests without due process of law, public employees dismissed for positive
drug test results must show that (1) they were stigmatized by the discharge
process; 2 85 (2) the test results were false; 286 (3) the grounds for dismissal were
made public or were readily available to prospective employers; 28 7 and (4) the
employees were denied a meaningful hearing to contest the charges and to
28 8
clear their names.
Public employees discharged for positive drug test results have claimed an
unfair deprivation of protected liberty interests in several instances. 28 9 It is
likely that discharge for drug use will severely hinder an employee's
opportunities to obtain a job elsewhere. Given the potentially low accuracy
rates of the tests, the reasons for the discharge will occasionally be false. If a
potential employer does not already know of local drug-related discharges,
applicants for employment will often be required to describe their previous
employment and reasons for leaving, thus publicizing the information.
281. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 436-37 (1971) (without a prior hearing, city
official may not publicly list a person as an alcoholic because of danger of unfair stigmatization and
infringement of legal right to buy liquor).
282. Wells v. Doland, 711 F.2d 670, 676 (5th Cir. 1983).
283. Id. at 675-76. Consequently, even though applicants for employment do not have
constitutionally protected property interests in that employment, they do possess liberty interests in
their reputation and freedom to work. These interests may be violated if they are denied
employment in a way which stigmatizes them and impairs their ability to obtain a job elsewhere in the
community. See Anderson v. City of Philadelphia, 845 F.2d 1216, 1221-22 (3d Cir. 1988) (applicants
allowed to raise liberty claims but claims rejected because no showing that city publicized
stigmatizing polygraph test results).
284. Wells v. Doland, 711 F.2d 670, 676 (5th Cir. 1983).
285. Id.
286. Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624, 627-28 (1977) (per curiam) (plaintiff not entitled to hearing
because he did not claim distributed information was false); Blanton v. Griel Memorial Psychiatric
Hosp., 758 F.2d 1540, 1544 (11th Cir. 1985) (no violation of plaintiff's liberty interests where he
failed to allege or show that employer's charges were false).
287. Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. 1500, 1505 (D.D.C. 1986) ("While there is no evidence that
defendants published their drug abuse finding, it is a reasonable inference that, unless expunged, the
rationale for her termination will remain in her file for automatic publication to any prospective
employer of plaintiff."), rev'd inparton other grounds, 833 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir. 1987). See Cleveland Bd.
of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 547 n.13 (1985) (plaintiff's failure to allege that reasons for
dismissal were publicized justified dismissal of due process liberty claim).
288. In re Selcraig, 705 F.2d 789, 795-96 (5th Cir. 1983).
289. See, e.g., Bostic v. McClendon, 650 F. Supp. 295, 251-52 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (no violation of
protected liberty interests because plaintiffs did not allege or prove that dismissal charges were
false); Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1520-21 (D.N.J. 1986) (due process liberty
interests violated); Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. 1500, 1505 (D.D.C. 1986), rev'd in part on other
grounds, 833 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (plaintiff established elements of due process liberty claim).
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Finally, several testing programs have not provided an adequate opportunity
to be heard before discharging the accused employees. 290 Under some
circumstances, therefore, due process may provide public employees
29
protection against unjust discharge based on drug testing. '
V
CONCLUSION

Fourth amendment analysis is, in essence, a framework for evaluating
social policy in difficult areas in which the interests of society and individuals
clash. Expectations of privacy must be "legitimate," and competing societal
and individual interests must be "balanced" in order to determine what is
"reasonable." As a forum for resolving these issues, the development of
fourth amendment doctrine represents a chronicle of societal tolerance, of the
degree of latitute individuals will be given and the breadth of power the state
will be allowed to exercise on behalf of society.
If upheld, drug testing will represent an unfortunate chapter in the fourth
amendment chronicle, a chapter in which individual interests were
subordinated to societal interests to a previously unheard of extent with
insufficient justification. As a highly intrusive bodily search without any
individualized suspicion, drug testing sets a precedent for the government to
monitor the bodily fluids of its subjects in order to supervise their activities.
Such a reduction of the rights of individuals should not be permitted without
a more exacting scrutiny than drug testing can withstand.
[The Bill of Rights] guarantee[s]to us all the rights to personal and spiritualselffulfillment. But the guarantee is not self-executing. As nightfall does not come at once,
neither does oppression. In both instances, there is a twilight when everything remains
290. See, e.g., Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1520-21 (D.N.J. 1986).
291. Several other constitutional challenges have been made against drug testing programs. At
least two employees discharged for positive urinalysis tests have claimed a violation of their right to
the equal protection of the laws, but these claims have been rejected by the courts. See Shoemaker v.
Handel, 795 F.2d 1136, 1143-44 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 577 (1986); Everett v. Napper, 833
F.2d 1507, 1513-14 (11 th Cir. 1987). Any claim based on the over- or underinclusiveness of a drug
testing program is likely to be rejected on the basis that the government can justifiably implement
testing one step at a time. See Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at 1143-44; Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S.
483, 489 (1955).
A novel challenge to one drug testing program was made in Rushton v. Nebraska Pub. Power
Dist., 844 F.2d 562 (8th Cir. 1988). In that case, two employees challenged the policy statement
accompanying a nuclear power plant's drug testing plan which contained the statement that drug and
alcohol abuse was an illness. The plaintiffs alleged that the statement violated their right to the free
exercise of their religion because they believed that drug and alcohol abuse was a sin, not an illness,
and their participation in the program gave their implied approval of the heretical policy statement.
Id. at 564. Applying Supreme Court precedent, the Eighth Circuit asked whether the regulation
burdened, directly or indirectly, the plaintiffs' religious practice. Finding that it did, the court found
that the limitation on their religious practice was justified by the overriding governmental interest of
preserving safety at the nuclear power plant. The court further found that the mandatory testing of
all designated employees was the least restrictive means of achieving its objective. The court denied
the plaintiffs an exemption from the program because of the uncertainty that background checks and
affidavits submitted by the burdened employees would truly insure that they were drug free. Id. at
565-66.
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seemingly unchanged. And it is in such twilight that we all must be most aware of change
in the air-however slight-lest we become unwitting victims of the darkness.29 2

292. W. DOUGLAS, THE DOuGLAs LE-rrERS 162 (M. Urofsky ed. 1987) (Sept. 10, 1976, letter to
Young Lawyers Section of the Wash. State Bar Ass'n).

